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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Research suggests that reasoning biases play a key role in the development and 
maintenance of paranoia. A number of cognitive interventions have been developed to 
ameliorate these biases, with the view that this will improve symptoms, functioning and 
quality of life in individuals with psychosis. Numerous research studies have tested the 
efficacy of these therapies, and integrating the evidence has important implications for 
individual, family and service-wide outcomes. The two papers presented in this thesis, a 
systematic review and an empirical study, aim to contribute to research in the area. The 
final section, which aims to place the thesis in a wider context, discusses the overall 
findings, personal reflections on the research process, some limitations of the two studies, 
and outlines implications for clinical interventions and future research. 
Paper One: Systematic review 
Background. It is widely acknowledged that reasoning biases contribute to both the 
development and maintenance of paranoid thinking. Common biases identified in the 
literature include the jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias and belief inflexibility. In view of 
the significant impact that these reasoning biases can have on daily functioning, many 
cognitive interventions have been developed to ameliorate these deficits. Some of these 
interventions are more broad-based, such as metacognitive training (MCT), whereas others 
are more targeted and focused treatments, such as video cognitive therapy (VCT) for 
Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits. The interventions typically utilise skills-based, 
instructional and experiential techniques to normalise, bring awareness to and ameliorate 
delusion-relevant cognitive biases. The effect of these interventions on the positive and 
negative symptoms of psychosis has been studied extensively in the literature. In contrast, 
the impact of these therapies on reasoning biases, in both the short and the long-term, has 
received less research attention.  
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Project aims and method. The study aimed to assess the effectiveness of existing 
cognitive therapies in alleviating reasoning biases in psychosis. Specifically, the review 
compared a number of different therapies on their efficacy, as well as exploring whether 
certain reasoning biases were more or less responsive to treatment. Potential studies were 
identified using a keyword search of three major online databases: Web of Science, 
PsycInfo and PubMed. A list of associated terms were generated for the key concepts of 
‘psychotic disorder’, ‘cognitive therapy’ and ‘reasoning biases’, and search terms were 
limited to article title and abstract. Articles identified as potentially relevant were collected 
and reviewed for appropriateness. Eligible studies were those using a randomised 
controlled study design (RCT), recruiting adults (18+) diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, 
and those published in English in peer-reviewed journals. Articles were excluded if they 
recruited individuals experiencing prodromal or non-clinical psychotic symptoms, or those 
experiencing psychosis in the context of bipolar disorder or dementia. Therapies could be 
self-directed, therapist-led, group or individual interventions. Three hundred and thirty-nine 
studies were screened for suitability and a total of 22 studies were included in the review. 
Analysis. A number of descriptive characteristics were extracted from each study, 
in order to highlight the significant similarities and differences between the studies 
reviewed. The information retrieved included a) study design features, such as location and 
setting b) participant characteristics, including diagnosis, ethnicity, gender and number 
recruited for the study c) both self-report and performance-based measures of reasoning 
where administered and d) type, format, frequency, duration and mode of delivery of the 
cognitive therapy delivered. Information regarding the efficacy of each intervention was 
also extracted. Where studies did not provide effect sizes, or where effect sizes were not 
reported in terms of Cohens d, this statistic was calculated by the researcher. 
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Results. One thousand, two hundred and fifty-four participants were included in the 
final review. Male participants outnumbered female participants, and the sample was 
comprised of individuals from a range of ethnic and age groups. Most of the studies 
delivered their intervention using a group format in an outpatient setting, and the 
interventions were, for the most part, delivered by professional therapists. The review found 
that targeted treatments were generally more effective than broad-based interventions at 
improving specific reasoning biases. In general, substantial improvements were reported in 
belief flexibility and ToM deficits following cognitive therapy. Changes in the JTC and 
attribution biases were less consistent, though still observed in most cases. In some 
instances, improvements in reasoning biases occurred during the follow-up period, 
indicating that changes may require some time to establish before positive effects emerge.  
Discussion. A number of factors may limit the generalizability of the review findings. 
Firstly, most studies applied strict eligibility criteria, which meant that individuals with a 
variety of co-morbidities, such as substance misuse, were excluded from participation. This 
limits the extent to which the findings can be applied to typical psychosis patients, who 
often present with more complex and severe difficulties. The choice of measurement tool 
used to detect changes in reasoning appeared to influence the findings that were reported. 
This should be addressed in future research to ensure consistency in the literature. Further, 
cognitive interventions which have not been tested using an RCT design, will have been 
excluded from, and thus not represented, in the current review. 
Recommendations and clinical implications. The findings suggest that there is 
promise for the use of cognitive interventions in ameliorating reasoning biases in clinical 
settings. In general, targeted interventions were more effective in facilitating long-term 
change in these biases, compared with more broad-based therapies. In light of this, 
individual needs, current symptoms and therapy goals should also be reviewed when 
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considering treatment options. The delivery of higher-quality, larger studies evaluating the 
effectiveness of these therapies in more representative samples would be of interest. In 
addition, studies with extensive follow-up assessments would be useful to ascertain long-
term treatment effects and stability. There is also a need to determine the optimum 
frequency and duration of treatment for specific reasoning biases, as well as of the 
cognitive therapy that is delivered. Further research is needed into how effective these 
treatments are with individuals experiencing prodromal and non-clinical symptoms, where 
reasoning biases are also prominent. Finally, there is a need for future research studies to 
measure the effectiveness of these interventions on real-world reasoning processes.   
Paper Two: Empirical study 
Background. It is widely acknowledged that a number of factors, such as pre-
existing beliefs and emotional states, can influence logical reasoning abilities. The interplay 
between emotion, beliefs and reasoning is of clear relevance to understanding the 
dysfunctional beliefs characteristic of many psychological disorders. It has been long 
suggested that these beliefs result from an illogical reasoning style, due to the fact that they 
are often resistant to change, despite being supported by little evidence in most cases. In 
light of this, however, a number of theories have been developed which propose that logical 
reasoning is not impaired in those with psychological illness per se, but instead focus on 
how beliefs and emotion influence logical reasoning processes. 
The belief bias theory suggests that dysfunctional beliefs result from a threat-
confirming, fear-based reasoning style. When making decisions regarding their feared 
beliefs, individuals with psychological disorder are thought to make a quick decision based 
on their instincts, before considering the logical validity of the conclusion they have drawn. 
This means that individuals are more likely to accept a conclusion as true or false in line 
with their beliefs, as opposed to its logical validity. There is debate in the literature as to 
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whether this enhanced belief bias is applied across all beliefs held by the individual, or 
whether it is specific to the dysfunctional belief. The dual-process model of reasoning 
offers a theoretical account of belief bias in deductive reasoning. The model distinguishes 
between two qualitatively different cognitive processes: Type one ‘intuitive’ reasoning 
processes (quick and based on the ‘gut-instinct’) and Type two ‘analytical’ reasoning 
processes (which are more logical and time-consuming). Research suggests that paranoia is 
positively associated with the presence of Type one thinking and negatively associated with 
the presence of Type two thinking, however, findings are mixed.  
 In contrast, the hyper-emotion theory (HET) of psychological illness suggests that 
emotions of excessive intensity may actually improve logical reasoning over time. The 
theory hypothesizes that efforts to make sense of intense emotional experiences serve to 
elaborate and perpetuate these experiences, resulting in enhanced reasoning abilities on 
topics relevant to the individuals’ difficulties. A number of studies assessing logical 
reasoning in individuals with psychological disorder have found evidence for the HET, 
dual-process model and belief bias theory. In light of this, the application of these theories 
to paranoia has received less research attention. 
Project aims. The study aimed to further the understanding of reasoning processes 
associated with paranoid thinking. Specifically, the study assessed logical reasoning and 
thinking styles in individuals with non-clinical paranoia, as an exploration of the HET, the 
belief bias theory, and the dual-process model of reasoning. In line with the HET, it was 
predicted that highly-paranoid (HP) and socially anxious (SA) participants (used as a 
comparison group and as a second test of the two theories) would reason more accurately 
on a logical reasoning task when the content was related to their concerns. In contrast, the 
belief bias theory predicts that HP and SA participants would reason in line with their 
beliefs, as opposed to the validity of the conclusions presented, when the task content was 
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related to their concerns. Finally, it was predicted that paranoia would be positively 
associated with Type one thinking and negatively associated with Type two thinking in the 
HP group.  
Methods. The cross-sectional study recruited 101 undergraduate psychology 
students to take part in the 30-minute, online study. Participants completed a host of self-
report questionnaires (Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-10), Depression, Anxiety and 
Stress Scale (DASS-21), the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) and the Paranoia Scale (PS)) 
and several experiential tasks (Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-4) and the Beads task) to 
assess participants’ thinking styles and symptomology. The study used a syllogistic 
reasoning task to assess logical reasoning abilities. In this task, participants were presented 
with a series of arguments (comprised of two statements and a conclusion) and were asked 
to decide whether the conclusion presented was logically valid. The syllogism conclusions 
varied according to their validity (valid/invalid), their plausibility (plausible/implausible) 
and their content (paranoia-related, social anxiety-related or non-specific). Participants 
were divided into three groups, a HP group, a SA group and a control group (L) consisting 
of participants scoring low on both measures.  
Analysis and results. Validity judgements of syllogism conclusions were used to 
assess logical reasoning abilities. A belief bias effect was found if participants found it 
easier to judge the validity of valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable syllogisms 
(i.e., when there was a match between validity and believability) and more difficult to judge 
the validity of valid-unbelievable and invalid-believable syllogisms. Belief bias summary 
scores (BB scores) were calculated for each content domain using the following formula: 
BB = conflict items ((valid-unbelievable + invalid-believable) - congruent items ((valid-
believable) + (invalid + unbelievable)). A higher score represented a larger degree of belief 
bias. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were used to explore differences between 
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groups on logical reasoning, according to syllogism content and plausibility. Correlation 
analyses were then conducted to assess whether paranoia was positively associated with 
Type one thinking and negatively associated with Type two thinking in the HP group. The 
study findings did not support the predictions made in line with the HET or the belief bias 
theory. Interestingly, the study found that paranoia severity was positively associated with 
Type two thinking, and to some extent Type one thinking, in the HP group.  
Discussion and reflections. A number of methodological limitations of the study 
should be noted. Firstly, the sample was mainly comprised of Caucasian, female, 
undergraduate students with non-clinical paranoia. This limits the extent to which the 
findings can be confidently applied to other groups. Further, whilst efforts were made to 
ensure that the syllogisms contained common, symptom-related concerns, they may not 
have matched sufficiently to individual beliefs to elicit the corresponding reasoning style 
described by each theory. Moreover, a lack of power could have meant that smaller 
differences between groups were not detected. In addition to this, research has shown that 
the activation of different reasoning styles may depend on the individual being in the feared 
state or situation, as opposed to being faced with hypothetical scenarios. As previous 
research has also found no evidence of enhanced reasoning in paranoid individuals with 
symptom-related content, it may be that paranoia is less easily explained by the HET. 
Finally, the findings suggest that the simple presence or absence of Type one or Type two 
thinking may not be sufficient to explain paranoia. The relative use and application of the 
two systems may be more relevant to understanding delusional beliefs.  
Future research and clinical implications. The current study highlights a range of 
possible avenues for future research. A larger-scale study should be conducted to ensure 
that more subtle differences in logical reasoning between groups can be detected. 
Syllogisms should be matched to individual concerns in a meaningful and relevant way in 
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order to ensure that the hypothesised reasoning styles can be elicited. Future research 
recruiting participants with clinically severe symptoms, and from a range of socio-
demographic backgrounds, would be of interest. Further, it may be clinically relevant to 
explore the ways by which both analytical and intuitive thinking is applied in anxiety-
inducing situations, as well as increasing awareness of the two opposing systems in 
treatment. Future research should also explore whether therapeutically manipulating 
thinking style alters the course of delusions. There is also a need to examine how intuitive 
and analytical thinking styles relate to other delusion-relevant biases. Finally, the inclusion 
of additional clinical variables such as global functioning and quality of life, to explore the 
wider impact of different thinking styles, would also be of value. 
Paper Three: Impact, integration and dissemination  
To summarise, this thesis aimed to further the understanding of reasoning biases 
across the psychosis continuum. Both studies highlighted the complexity of the various 
reasoning processes associated with paranoia. Limitations of the research methodology 
were discussed in both papers, along with ideas for future research and the clinical 
implications of the study findings. It is anticipated that paper one will be submitted to 
Clinical Psychology Review for publication. The review findings suggest that there are a 
number of different cognitive interventions available, and that they are effective in 
ameliorating reasoning biases in individuals with psychosis. It is anticipated that the study 
will increase awareness of the different therapies available for use by professionals working 
with individuals with psychosis. Further, it is also hoped that the review findings will 
influence the treatment recommendations made for specific reasoning biases, as well as the 
types of therapies offered by mental health services. 
The findings of paper two have been presented to other trainee clinical 
psychologists and staff members and will be stored in the institution’s electronic archives. 
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Paper two will also be submitted to the Schizophrenia Research journal for publication. The 
impact of this paper is likely to occur incrementally, in the context of a broader field of 
research over time, as research exploring logical reasoning in paranoia becomes more 
prevalent. It is hoped that the current study will inspire the development of future research 
exploring the HET, the dual-process model and the belief bias theory in relation to 
paranoia. Further, the findings highlight the importance of assessing, and potentially 
working therapeutically with, intuitive and analytical reasoning processes in those 
experiencing paranoid thoughts. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
It is widely acknowledged that reasoning biases play a key role in the development and 
persistence of delusional beliefs in individuals with psychosis. In light of this, a number of 
cognitive therapies have been developed and utilised to ameliorate these biases. In order to 
assess the efficacy of these treatments, a systematic review of studies that empirically tested 
the effects of a cognitive intervention was conducted. Twenty-two randomised controlled 
trials (RCT’s) met inclusion criteria, and effect sizes were calculated and reported for each 
study. The majority of the studies reviewed tested the efficacy of broad-based, cognitive 
interventions such as metacognitive training (MCT). In contrast, several studies tested more 
focused interventions, such as video cognitive therapy (VCT) for Theory of Mind (ToM) 
deficits. The review revealed that there are many cognitive interventions available which 
show promise in improving outcomes. The findings suggest that targeted treatments may be 
more effective than broad-based interventions at improving specific reasoning biases, 
though this warrants further research attention. Generally, profound improvements were 
reported in belief flexibility and theory of mind (ToM) abilities. Changes in the jumping to 
conclusions (JTC) bias and attribution biases were less consistent, though present in most 
cases. Conclusions were limited by factors such as a lack of follow-up assessment and 
differences in measurement tools used across studies. Future research should address these 
limitations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Understanding psychosis  
Psychosis is a psychological condition whereby an individual’s experience of the world 
around them is disrupted, and those experiencing psychosis are said to be, to some extent, 
‘out of touch with reality’ (Bentall, 2004). Psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia are 
associated with high rates of co-morbid mental health difficulties such as depression 
(Dernovsek & Sprah, 2009), increased alcohol and substance use (Gregg, Barrowclough & 
Haddock, 2007) and a number of physical health problems (Moreno et al., 2013). Following 
the onset of a psychotic disorder, which typically emerge during early adulthood, the 
individual experiences a number of psychological changes. These include disruptions to 
cognitive processes such as attention and perception, which are often associated with 
symptoms such as hallucinations and delusional beliefs. Interpersonal and occupational 
functioning can also be impacted by these experiences, as well as by the negative symptoms 
of psychosis such as apathy, decreased social skills and blunted emotional responses. 
Research suggests that fewer than 50% of people with non-affective psychosis achieve 
social recovery, and fewer than 14% of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia achieve 
sustained recovery on both symptomatic and functional outcomes (Jääskeläinen et al., 
2012).  
The possible causes of psychosis are complex, and most researchers now agree that 
the illness is likely caused by a combination of genetic and environmental factors, as 
summarised by the stress-vulnerability model (Zubin & Spring, 1977). Family studies have 
shown that, compared with a lifetime risk for schizophrenia of around 1% in the general 
population, the risk in siblings of someone with the disorder is around 10%, with this risk 
increasing as more relatives are affected (Lichtenstein et al., 2009). Other possible causal 
factors include early childhood abuse (Janssen et al., 2004), recreational drug use 
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(Arseneault et al., 2002), social isolation or exclusion (Spauwen, Krabbendam, Lieb, 
Wittchen & van Os, 2004) and trauma (Freeman & Fowler, 2009). Due to this complexity, 
it has been argued that psychological treatments for psychosis may be more effective when 
they target individual symptoms such as paranoia (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & 
Bebbington, 2002). A number of psychological interventions have since been developed to 
target the mechanisms thought to maintain these experiences (Freeman et al., 2011; 
Vorontsova, Garety & Freeman, 2013). 
Paranoia and persecutory delusions 
Paranoia is defined as ‘the unfounded fear that others intend to cause you harm’ (e.g., 
‘other people are out to get me’; Freeman, Pugh & Garety, 2008) and questionnaire and 
interview data have found that paranoid thinking occurs in 15–20% of the general 
population. It has therefore been proposed that there is a continuum of severity of paranoia, 
and at the extreme end are the persecutory delusions seen in psychotic disorders. These 
delusional beliefs are thought to be present in over 70% of people with psychosis at first 
episode (Coid et al., 2013) and are often held with strong conviction, even in the face of 
contradictory evidence (Dickson, Barsky, Kinderman, King & Taylor, 2016). These 
strongly held beliefs are often associated with considerable distress for the individual, as 
well as being linked to an increased risk of hospitalisation, violence and suicide attempts 
(Freeman & Garety, 2004; Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley & Slater, 2010).  
Researchers have developed a cognitive model of persecutory delusions in an 
attempt to better understand how these beliefs may develop (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & 
Freeman, 2001; see Figure 1). The model acknowledges that the ways by which an 
individual interprets and attaches meaning to events will influence how they feel and 
behave in response. The researchers go onto explain that in the case of psychosis, these 
interpretations are influenced by a number of factors such as high levels of arousal, 
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anomalous experiences and pre-existing beliefs about the self, the world and other people. 
These interpretations may also be influenced by cognitions experienced in the context of 
co-morbid mental health difficulties such as depression and anxiety. The model also 
explains that a persecutory belief is more likely to develop if an individual already believes 
that they are vulnerable, that they deserve to be harmed in some way (Trower & Chadwick, 
1995), or if they view other people and the world as a dangerous place on the basis of 
earlier experiences such as trauma.  
Of particular importance here, is that the search for meaning and eventual acceptance 
of the threat belief is considerably influenced by a number of cognitive reasoning biases 
associated with psychosis. A large body of research has shown that these biases contribute 
to both the development and maintenance of delusional beliefs; therefore these biases are 
often the target of psychological treatments (Waller et al., 2015).  
 
Figure 1. The formation of a persecutory delusion (Garety et al., 2001) 
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Reasoning biases in Psychosis  
Jumping to Conclusions (JTC) bias. The JTC bias is one of the most studied 
cognitive biases in psychosis research, and is defined as a ‘tendency to gather less 
information compared to controls before making a decision’ (Freeman et al., 2007). It is 
hypothesised that, when present, this bias may lead to the premature acceptance of 
implausible ideas and prevent the consideration of more realistic, alternative explanations 
of events (Freeman et al., 2008). Recent research has found that over two-thirds of 
individuals with delusions display the JTC bias (Van Dael et al., 2005), as well as being 
observed in patients no longer experiencing delusions (Peters, Day & Garety, 2004), those 
experiencing non-clinical paranoia, and those at high risk of developing a psychotic 
disorder (Colbert & Peters, 2002). Further, research has shown that the JTC bias is 
associated with a poorer treatment response in individuals with psychosis (Menon, Mizrahi 
& Kapur, 2008). 
The JTC bias is the target of many cognitive interventions for individuals with 
psychosis, in the hope that this may reduce delusional ideation and improve outcomes. In 
experimental studies, the most common paradigm used to measure JTC is the “beads task” 
(Ross et al., 2015). This task involves showing individuals two jars of beads in equal but 
opposite ratios (eg., 60 red beads and 40 blue beads and vice versa). Both jars are then 
hidden, and the participant is told that individual beads will be drawn consecutively from 
one jar. The task of the participant is to eventually decide which jar the beads are being 
drawn from. The main outcome variable is the number of beads drawn before a decision is 
made, but JTC can also be defined as making a decision after viewing the first, second or 
third bead shown (Fine, Gardner, Craigie & Gold, 2007).  
Belief flexibility. Belief flexibility in the context of paranoia can be defined as ‘a 
metacognitive process involving thinking about one's own delusional beliefs, changing 
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them in the light of reflection and evidence and generating and considering alternatives’ 
(Colbert, Peters & Garety, 2010). A defining feature of delusional beliefs is their 
inflexibility. As a result of this, paranoid individuals may hold onto their beliefs with a lot 
of conviction, even when faced with contradictory information and little supporting 
evidence. In individuals with psychosis, an inflexible thinking style is thought to be a 
global trait, as opposed to being specific to the delusional beliefs themselves (Colbert et al., 
2010), although research findings are mixed. Clinically, change in delusional conviction is 
often facilitated by the individual considering that a belief may be mistaken, and through 
the consideration of alternative explanations for their experiences. Belief flexibility has 
been found to predict successful response to psychological therapy for psychosis (Garety et 
al., 1997).   
Belief flexibility is often assessed experimentally using the Possibility of Being 
Mistaken (PM) and Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) items of the Maudsley 
Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS; Taylor, Garety, Buchanan, Reed & Wessely, 
1994). These items assess, in the context of an interview, whether the individual can 
consider it at all possible that they may be mistaken in their concerns, however unlikely, 
and also to consider a hypothetical but plausible piece of evidence that might contradict 
their belief.  
Attribution bias. Cognitive models of paranoia have highlighted the role of 
attribution biases in the development and maintenance of persecutory beliefs (Freeman et 
al., 2002); however the exact mechanisms by which they operate remain unclear. Bentall 
and colleagues (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001) distinguished 
between an externalizing bias (a tendency for non-self attributions for negative events) and 
a personalising bias (a tendency to blame other people for negative events). These biases 
are thought to minimize the discrepancy between the ‘real self’ and the ‘ideal self’, 
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therefore serving a defensive function for the individual's self-esteem (Bentall et al., 2001). 
Interestingly, there is less evidence to suggest that individuals with psychosis attribute 
positive events internally (Garety & Freeman, 1999) and several studies have found that 
these biases do not differ according to event type (McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, 2005; 
Moritz & Woodward, 2007). These findings have led some researchers to argue that 
attribution biases may not be purely self-serving in nature (Lincoln, Mehl, Exner, 
Lindenmeyer & Rief, 2010). Alternatively, this bias may reflect a difficulty in taking a 
number of situational factors into account in complex social situations (Heinrichs & 
Zakzanis, 1998).  
Experimentally, attribution biases are assessed using both experiential tasks and 
questionnaire measures such as the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire (AIHQ; 
Combs, Penn, Wicher & Waldheter, 2007). With this measure, participants read a series of 
vignettes describing a number of social situations. Following this, individuals are then 
asked about the intentions of the characters in the vignette, and how the subjects would 
respond in the given situation.  
Theory of Mind. Theory of mind (ToM) refers to ‘the cognitive capacity to 
represent one's own and other persons' mental states, for instance, in terms of thinking, 
believing, or pretending’ (Brune, 2005). Distinctions have been made between first-order 
ToM, defined as the ability to understand another person's thoughts and emotions, and 
second-order ToM, the ability to infer what one person thinks about another person's 
thoughts or emotions (Gregory et al., 2002). Several studies have assessed ToM abilities in 
individuals with psychosis (Corcoran, Mercer & Smith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996). 
Frith and Corcoran (1996) found that psychosis patients performed worse than controls on 
first-order and second-order false belief ToM tasks (Frith & Corcoran, 1996), whereby 
participants had difficulties understanding hints, some forms of humour and conversational 
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rules. Meta-analysis findings suggest that this ToM deficit is a stable trait-characteristic, 
rather than a consequence of the active phase of psychosis (Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox 
& Van Engeland, 2007) and is often associated with impaired interpersonal functioning 
(Couture, Penn & Roberts, 2006). As a result of this, individuals with psychosis may 
experience a range of negative outcomes, such as unemployment, social isolation and 
depression (Mancuso, Horan, Kern & Green, 2011; Marwaha & Johnson, 2004). 
In experimental research, ToM ability is often measured using tools such as the 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & 
Plumb, 2001). In this task, participants are asked to infer the emotional state of the person 
that is presented in a given picture, based on that person's facial expression. 
The treatment of psychosis 
Historically, psychosis was largely viewed as a medical disorder, with treatment 
focused primarily on hospitalisation and antipsychotic medication. The past twenty years or 
so, however, has seen the development and utilisation of evidence-based psychological 
treatments to treat symptoms of psychosis. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, whilst 
taking antipsychotic medication is no doubt beneficial in many cases, studies have shown 
that they are only partially effective in relieving symptoms in approximately 40% of 
patients (Kapur, 2003). Secondly, adherence to antipsychotic medication is generally low, 
often due to the unpleasant side effects experienced by many who take them (Arana, 2000). 
Further, whilst antipsychotics have been found to successfully treat positive symptoms, 
they are thought to be less effective in treating the negative symptoms experienced by 
patients (Bobes, Arango, Garcia-Garcia & Rejas, 2010). Finally, medication does not 
typically take into account a wide range of individuals' other concerns about their 
experiences, and often fails to address a number of other difficulties, particularly those of a 
social and cognitive nature (Goldberg et al., 2007).  
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In view of the significant impact that these reasoning biases can have on daily 
functioning (Langdon, Connors, Still, Ward & Catts, 2014), a number of cognitive 
interventions have been developed, and utilised clinically, to ameliorate these deficits. 
Although there is a wealth of literature exploring the impact of such therapies on psychotic 
symptoms, the short and long-term impact of these interventions on reasoning biases has 
received less research attention. Further, following an extensive search of the literature, it 
was concluded that there have been no reviews of this nature conducted to date. In light of 
this, the current review explored the efficacy of existing cognitive interventions in 
ameliorating reasoning biases in individuals with psychosis. 
 
METHOD 
Inclusion criteria 
Eligible studies were those published in peer-reviewed journals in the English language, 
using a sample of adults (18+) diagnosed with a psychotic disorder. Psychotic disorders 
included in the review were: schizophrenia, first episode psychosis, schizophreniform 
disorder, brief psychotic disorder, schizoaffective disorder, delusional disorder and 
psychotic disorder: not otherwise specified (NOS). Studies could be self-led or therapist-
led, and group or individual interventions. Only RCT’s were included in the review as 
they enable the researcher to attribute changes in reasoning biases to the intervention with 
increased confidence. All included studies reported on a standalone cognitive intervention 
measuring change in at least one reasoning bias, before and after treatment, to allow for 
direct comparison. Control groups consisted of either an active control condition, treatment-
as-usual or a wait-list control group. Studies which utilised only one control group, in 
which participants received another cognitive intervention to the one under study, were 
excluded from the review.  
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Exclusion criteria 
Qualitative studies, conference abstracts or posters, meta-analyses or other reviews, 
dissertations, book chapters, and studies with a non-RCT design were excluded from the 
results. Studies were also excluded if they recruited individuals experiencing sub-clinical or 
prodromal symptoms of psychosis. Studies which recruited participants experiencing 
psychosis in the context of dementia (or any other neurological condition) or bipolar 
disorder were also excluded, where this was made explicit to the reader.  
Search strategy 
To identify suitable studies to be included in the review, a literature search was 
conducted on several psychological and social science online databases. The search was 
conducted on 2nd March 2018. Subsequently, screening of texts was conducted by searching 
the following electronic databases: Web of Science, PsycInfo and PubMed. The following 
search string was used within each database: CBT OR cognitive behaviour* therapy OR 
cognitive OR cognitive behavior* therapy OR cognitive therapy OR cognitive remediation 
OR metacognitive therapy OR metacognitive training OR training OR cognitive bias 
modification  AND  2) reasoning OR attribution OR theory of mind OR jumping to 
conclusions OR need for closure OR belief flexibility OR cognitive bias OR appraisal OR 
self-serving bias OR confirmatory bias OR confirmation bias AND 3) Schizophren* OR 
Psychotic OR Psychosis OR delusion* OR Schizotyp* OR Schizoa*. Search was limited to 
study title, with title/abstract searches carried out on the PubMed database.  
The titles and abstracts of the 338 potentially relevant studies were screened for 
initial assessment of their suitability according to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Screening of reference lists yielded one further study for assessment. After the removal of 
76 duplicates, the abstracts and titles of the remaining 263 studies were screened for 
eligibility. The screening process identified 56 articles which could potentially meet the 
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inclusion criteria. The full text versions of these publications were then retrieved and a 
further 34 articles were excluded from the study. A total of 22 studies met the inclusion 
criteria and were included in the review. Figure 2 below provides a PRISMA diagram 
(Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff & Altman, 2009) which indicates how the papers were selected. 
Table 1 describes the reviewed studies in detail.  
 
Figure 2. PRISMA diagram of systematic literature review 
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Data extraction 
The following information was extracted from each study where possible: a) study 
design features, including study location and setting, author name and publication date b) 
participant characteristics, including diagnosis, number of participants recruited for each 
study as well as their mean age, gender and ethnicity c) the frequency of both self-report 
and performance-based measures of reasoning biases where administered and d) type, 
format, frequency, duration and mode of delivery of the cognitive intervention delivered. 
Information regarding the efficacy of each intervention was reported where adequate data 
was available, which included extracting effect sizes for statistically significant results. 
Where studies did not provide effect sizes, or where effect sizes were not reported in terms 
of Cohens d, effect sizes were calculated or converted using an online calculator 
(https://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html). Where effect sizes are not described 
below, this is because the necessary data were not provided. 
Method of synthesis 
Rationale for a systematic review. A systematic review of the literature was used 
to integrate and synthesise the relevant studies. The primary aim of a systematic review is 
to identify, evaluate and synthesize evidence in order to answer a research question 
(Higgins & Green, 2011). A particular strength of the systematic review process is the 
transparency and clarity of the methods used, which can then be replicated by others. In 
addition, a systematic review allows the researcher to take into account a range of findings 
on a particular topic, which was particularly relevant in this case due to the number of 
reasoning biases and cognitive interventions considered.  
This type of review was chosen over other methods such as a meta-analysis or a 
narrative review. A meta-analysis was not deemed suitable for this review due to the 
diversity across studies, in terms of the outcome measures, the methodologies used and the 
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nature of the interventions. More consistency across studies would allow for a meta-
analysis to be conducted in the future. Similarly, there are several disadvantages to 
conducting a narrative review, including the fact that they can be quite subjective and can 
often lack a clear and replicable methods section. This in turn could lead to methodological 
flaws and can bias the conclusions that are drawn by the reviewer (Cronin, Ryan & 
Coughlan, 2008).  
Quality appraisal 
The Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative studies (National Collaborating 
Centre for Methods and Tools), developed by the Effective Public Health Practice Project 
(EPHPP) was used to assess the methodological quality of the reviewed studies, in order to 
guide the interpretation of the results. The EPHPP has been found to have good content and 
construct validity (Thomas, Ciliska, Dobbins & Micucci, 2004) and inter-rater reliability 
(Armijo-Olivo, Stiles, Hagen, Biondo & Cummings, 2010). The tool assesses the following 
six domains: (A) Selection bias, (B) Study design, (C) Confounders, (D) Blinding, (E) Data 
collection methods and (F) Withdrawals and drop-outs. The intervention integrity and the 
analysis methods used are also assessed but, according to the EPHPP, these do not 
contribute to the overall quality rating of the study (though are discussed in the review 
where relevant). Each domain is rated as ‘strong’, ‘moderate’ or ‘weak’ and a global rating 
is then given to each study. Each study is rated as either ‘strong’ (no weak ratings), 
‘moderate’ (one weak rating) or ‘weak’ (two or more weak ratings) (see Table 2 for overall 
study ratings and Appendix 7 for individual domain scores).  
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Author &  
Country 
Sample 
Size 
Gender 
Mean age 
Ethnicity 
Setting Diagnosis Reasoning 
Bias 
Intervention 
& modality 
Intervention 
duration 
Control 
group 
Follow
-up 
Outcome 
ee 
measures 
 
 
 
 
Aghotor et 
al. (2010) 
 
Germany 
N = 30  
(12M/14F) 
30.75 
 
Inpatient Schizophrenia JTC Group MCT  Twice 
weekly, 45-
minute 
sessions for 
four weeks.  
Active 
control  
(newspaper 
discussion 
group) 
No 1. BADE 
  
 
Bechi et al. 
(2015) 
 
Italy 
N=75  
(43M/32F) 
38.54 
Not 
described 
Schizophrenia ToM Group ToMI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group SCST 
 
ToMI = twice 
weekly, one-
hour 
sessions. 18 
sessions in 
total. 
 
SCST = one 
weekly, one-
hour 
sessions. 12 
sessions in 
total 
Active 
control  
(newspaper 
discussion 
group) 
No 1. PST 
Fernandez-
Gonzalo et 
al. (2015) 
 
Spain 
N= 53  
(34M/19F) 
30.46 
Outpatient Schizophrenia 
 
Schizoaffective 
disorder 
ToM 
 
Attribution 
biases 
Individual 
SCST in 
clinic 
Twice 
weekly, one-
hour 
sessions; up 
to five 
months. 
Active 
control 
(non-
specific 
computer 
training 
group) 
No 1. IPSAQ 
2. Eyes task 
3. Hinting Task 
4. False belief 
stories 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of cognitive interventions targeting reasoning biases 
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Garety et al. 
(2015) 
 
UK 
N= 101  
(61M/40F) 
41.6 
  
61% White  
 
24% Black 
African/ 
Caribbean 
 
15% Asian 
or other 
Inpatient & 
Outpatient 
Schizophrenia 
 
Delusional 
disorder 
 
Schizoaffective 
disorder 
 
Psychosis NOS 
JTC 
 
Belief 
flexibility 
Individual 
MCT 
1.5–3 hour 
sessions, 
three 
meetings 
Active 
control  
Yes 
(two 
weeks) 
1. MADS 
2. EoE 
3. Beads task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gaweda et 
al. (2015) 
 
Poland 
N= 44  
(22M/22F) 
51.05 
Community  Chronic 
Schizophrenia 
JTC 
 
ToM 
Group MCT Eight 
modules (45–
60 minutes 
each session) 
TAU  No 
1.CBQp 
2. Fish Task 
 
 
 
 
Horan et al. 
(2009) 
 
USA 
N= 31  
(29M/2F) 
48.3  
 
55% 
African 
American 
 
29% White  
Outpatient Schizophrenia 
 
Schizoaffective 
disorder  
Attribution 
biases 
 
ToM 
Group SCST  12, twice-
weekly, one-
hour 
sessions.  
Active 
control 
(illness 
manageme
nt and 
relapse 
prevention 
skills)  
No 1. AIHQ 
2. TASIT 
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16% Other 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Horan et al. 
(2011) 
 
USA 
N= 80 
(30M, 5F 
in two 
conditions 
of interest) 
48.05 
 
32% White 
 
14% 
Hispanic 
 
54% Black  
Outpatient   
& 
community 
Schizophrenia 
 
Schizoaffective 
disorder 
 
Delusional 
disorder 
 
Psychosis NOS  
Attribution 
biases 
 
ToM 
Group SCST   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24-sessions  Active 
control 
(illness 
manageme
nt group)  
No 1.  AIHQ 
2.  TASIT 
 
Kayser et al. 
(2006) 
 
France 
N= 14  
(3F/ 11M) 
35.3 
Outpatients 
& one 
Inpatient 
Schizophrenia ToM Individual 
VCT 
Two, 1-hour 
training 
sessions, over 
one-week  
TAU No 1. Inference 
intention task 
2. SCD scale 
Khazaal et 
al. (2015) 
 
Switzerland 
France 
Monaco & 
Italy 
N= 172  
(107M/65F
) 
37.05 
 
Outpatients  Psychotic 
disorder NOS 
Belief 
flexibility 
Group CBT-
based 
training 
module 
Weekly 
sessions 
lasting one 
hour. Mean 
number of 
sessions = 12 
TAU Yes  
(6 
month) 
1. MADS 
Kuokkanen 
et al. (2014) 
N= 20 
(20M) 
Inpatient Schizophrenia JTC Group MCT Eight, twice-
weekly 45-
TAU Yes (6 
month) 
1.Fish task 
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Finland 
43.55 
 
minute 
sessions. 
Mazza et al. 
(2010) 
 
Italy 
N=32  
(13F/19M) 
24.54 
 
Not 
specified 
Schizophrenia Attribution 
biases 
 
ToM 
Group ETIT Twice 
weekly 
sessions over 
12-weeks. 
Active 
control 
(problem 
solving 
training) 
No 1.  Advanced 
ToM Scale 
 
Moritz et al. 
(2011) 
Germany 
N=36 
(28M/8F) 
32.75 
 
Inpatient & 
outpatient  
Schizophrenia  JTC Group MCT Once weekly 
sessions 
(maximum of 
eight 
sessions) 
Wait-list 
control 
No 1. Fish Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Moritz et al. 
(2015a) 
 
Germany 
N= 90  
(33M/57F) 
40.45 
 
Not 
specified 
Schizophrenia 
 
Schizoaffective 
disorder 
JTC Individual 
MCT 
Online 
intervention 
with modules 
Waitlist 
control  
Yes (3 
month)  
1. Fish Task 
 
 
 
 
 
Moritz et al. 
(2015b) 
 
Germany 
N=70  
(43F/27M) 
40.68 
 
Outpatient 
& 
community 
Schizophrenia  JTC Individual 
CBC 
Slides sent 
out via e-mail 
weekly for 6 
weeks 
Waitlist 
control 
No 1. Fish Task 
Ochoa et al. 
(2017) 
 
Spain 
N=126  
(85M/37F) 
27.63 
 
 
Outpatient 
& 
community 
Schizophrenia 
 
Psychosis NOS 
 
Delusional 
disorder 
 
Schizoaffective 
JTC 
 
ToM 
 
Attribution 
bias 
Group MCT Eight, weekly 
sessions  
Active 
Control 
(psycho-
education) 
Yes (6 
month) 
1. Beads task 
2. IPSAQ 
3. Hinting task 
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disorder 
 
Brief psychotic 
disorder 
 
Schizophrenifo
-rm disorder 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pino et al. 
(2015) 
 
Italy 
 
N= 14  
(7M/7F) 
43.63 
 
Outpatient Schizophrenia ToM  Group ETIT Twice 
weekly 
sessions over 
a 12-week 
period 
 
 
Active 
control 
(problem 
solving 
training) 
No 1. Advanced 
ToM task 
2. The eyes 
task 
3.  Emotion 
Attribution 
Task 
Pos et al 
(2018) 
 
Netherlands 
N=50 
(40M/10F) 
23.34 
 
 
Inpatient & 
Outpatient 
First episode 
psychosis 
JTC Group MCT Eight 
sessions 
OT support No 1. Beads task 
Roberts et 
al. (2014) 
 
 
N=66 
(44M/22F) 
39.7 
 
White: 
61% 
African-
American: 
33% 
Hispanic: 
6% 
 
Outpatient Schizophrenia 
 
Schizoaffective 
disorder 
ToM 
 
Attribution 
biases 
Group SCIT  20–24 
weekly, hour-
long sessions. 
TAU Yes (3 
month) 
1. TASIT 
2. Hinting task 
3. AIHQ 
 
So et al. 
(2015) 
N= 44  
(24M/20F) 
Outpatient Schizophrenia  JTC 
 
Individual 
MCT 
1 hour 
sessions, 
Waitlist 
control 
Yes (1 
month) 
1. MADS 
2.  Beads task 
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                  Note: JTC: jumping to conclusions; MCT metacognitive therapy; BADE: Bias against disconfirmatory evidence; ToM: theory of mind; SCST: social 
cognition skills training; ToMI: theory of mind intervention; PST: picture sequencing task; IPSAQ: Internal, Personal and 
Situational Attributions Questionnaire; MADS: Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule; EoE: explanation of experiences; CBQp: cognitive 
biases questionnaire; AIHQ: Ambiguous Intentions and Hostility Questionnaire; TASIT: The Awareness of Social Inference Test; TAU: treatment as 
usual; SCD scale: Schizophrenia Communication Disorder Scale; ETIT: Emotion and ToM Imitation Training; CBC: cognitive bias correction; SCIT: 
 
Hong Kong 
33.94 
 
 
Belief 
flexibility 
once a week, 
over four 
weeks 
 
Taylor et al. 
(2016) 
 
UK 
N=36  
(36M) 
39.95 
 
 
Forensic 
Inpatient 
Schizophrenia  ToM 
 
Attribution 
biases 
Group SCIT 16, twice 
weekly 
sessions 
lasting 45-
minutes 
TAU No 1. Hinting task 
2. AIHQ 
 
Waller at al. 
(2015) 
 
UK 
N= 31  
(22M/9F) 
41.03 
 
White: 
41.9% 
Black 
Caribbean/
African/Ot
her: 42% 
Mixed 
Race: 9.7% 
Asian: 
3.2% 
Other: 
3.2% 
Outpatient Schizophrenia  Belief 
flexibility 
Individual 
Thinking 
well 
intervention 
(CBT) 
Six sessions  TAU  Yes (2 
month)  
1. EoE 
2. MADS 
 
 
Wang et al. 
(2013) 
 
China 
N= 39  
(20M/19F) 
42.37 
Outpatient Schizophrenia ToM 
 
Attribution 
biases 
Group SCIT 20-week 
intervention  
Wait-list 
control 
Yes (6 
month) 
1. Eyes task 
2. ASQ 
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social cognition and interaction training; CBT: cognitive behavioural therapy; ASQ: attribution style questionnaire; VCT: video cognitive therapy; 
OT: Occupational Therapy
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RESULTS 
Overview of included studies  
Intervention format and duration. Fifteen studies delivered their intervention in a 
group setting, with only seven studies offering therapy on an individual basis (Waller et al., 
2015; Fernandez-Gonzalo et al., 2015; So et al., 2015; Moritz, Thoering, Kuhn, Willenborg 
& Westermann, 2015a; Moritz et al., 2015b; Kayser, Sarfati, Besche & Hardy-Baylé, 2006; 
Garety et al., 2014). Group sessions utilised either one or a combination of the following 
presentation formats: comic strips and photographs, teaching sessions, experiential 
activities, computerised tasks, written hand-outs, PowerPoint presentations, videos, card 
games, written vignettes, discussions or role play exercises. Individual therapy sessions 
were carried out face-to-face with a therapist (including the use of interactive exercises, 
film clips, discussions and psychoeducation), using a computerized or online intervention, 
or through the use of video recordings.  
Setting. Twelve studies were conducted at outpatient clinics or in the community 
(Fernandez-Gonzalo et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2013; Waller et al., 2015; So et al., 2015; 
Roberts et al., 2014; Pino, Pettinelli, Clementi, Gianfelice & Mazza, 2015; Ochoa et al., 
2017; Moritz et al., 2015b;  Khazaal et al., 2015; Horan et al., 2011; Horan et al., 2009; 
Gaweda, Krężołek, Olbryś, Turska & Kokoszka, 2015). Three studies recruited exclusively 
from inpatient populations (Taylor et al., 2016;  Kuokkanen, Lappalainen, Repo-Tiihonen 
& Tiihonen, 2014; Aghotor, Pfueller, Moritz, Weisbrod & Roesch-Ely, 2010) and four 
studies recruited from both inpatient and outpatient groups (Moritz et al., 2011; Kayser et 
al., 2006; Garety et al., 2015; Pos et al., 2018). Three studies did not explicitly specify 
where they recruited from (Moritz et al., 2015a; Mazza et al., 2010; Bechi et al., 2015).  
Therapists or instructors. Nineteen cognitive interventions were delivered by 
professionals (counsellors, psychiatric nurses, psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
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rehabilitation therapists and trainee clinical psychologists), bachelors levels clinicians or 
psychology graduates. Three interventions were implemented online or using a computer in 
a healthcare clinic (Moritz et al., 2015a; Moritz et al., 2015b; Fernandez-Gonzalo et al., 
2015). 
Review of research methodology 
Research design. The studies included in this review were all RCT’s and 16 out of 
the 22 publications included in the review were graded as high quality according to the 
EPHPP quality assessment tool (see Appendix 7). Nevertheless, descriptions of key areas 
of methodology were missing in several cases. For example, although all studies reported 
that participants were randomised to experimental and control groups, not all studies 
provided an adequate description of the methods used to achieve this (Bechi et al., 2015; 
Gaweda et al., 2015).  
All studies included a baseline and an end-of-treatment assessment. Nine studies 
conducted follow-up assessments which ranged from two weeks to six-months post-
treatment. Thirteen studies utilised either a wait-list or TAU control group, with the 
remaining nine studies using an active control condition. For example, Garety and 
colleagues (2015) used a time and format-matched interactive computer task when 
exploring the efficacy of an individual, computer-based MCT intervention.  
Outcome measures. A variety of valid and reliable instruments were employed by 
researchers to measure reasoning biases (see Table 1). Nine of the 10 studies measuring the 
JTC bias utilised the beads/fish task (Garety et al., 2015; Gaweda et al., 2015; Kuokkanen 
et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2011; Moritz et al., 2015a, Moritz et al., 2015b; Ochoa et al., 
2017; Pos et al., 2018; So et al., 2015). Further, all studies used interview-based measures, 
namely the MADS and the EoE, to assess belief flexibility (Waller et al., 2015; So et al., 
2015;  Khazaal et al., 2015; Garety et al., 2015). A number of experiential tasks and 
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questionnaire-based measures were used to assess ToM abilities and attribution biases 
(Wang et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2016), including the Ambiguous Intentions and Hostility 
Questionnaire (AHIQ). 
Sample formation. Studies used a variety of recruitment methods and eligibility 
criteria to form their sample. All studies recruited participants who were diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder. Other eligibility criteria included the exclusion of patients experiencing 
severe thought disorder and suspiciousness (Aghotor et al., 2010), alcohol or substance 
dependency (Garety et al., 2015) and individuals with intellectual disabilities (Roberts et 
al., 2014). Recruitment methods included invitation e-mails (Moritz et al., 2015b), referrals 
from the participants’ clinical therapist (Ochoa et al., 2017) and through the systematic 
reviewing of medical records (Khazaal et al., 2015). Four studies recruited participants 
according to the phase of their psychosis (Fernandez-Gonzalo et al., 2015; Pos et al., 2018; 
Gaweda et al., 2015; Ochoa et al., 2017). For example, Pos and colleagues (2018) aimed to 
explore the efficacy of MCT in early psychosis, and so only recruited individuals 
experiencing their first psychotic symptoms. Four studies offered financial incentives for 
those taking part in their research at outcome assessment points (Roberts et al., 2014; 
Moritz et al., 2011; Khazaal et al., 2015; Horan et al., 2011). Sample sizes varied 
considerably, ranging from 14 (Pino et al., 2015) to 172 participants (Khazaal et al., 2015).  
Participant characteristics. One thousand, two hundred and fifty-four participants 
from the 22 studies were included in the review. Overall, male participants outnumbered 
female participants (61% vs. 39%). This is unsurprising given that studies indicate that 
rates of psychosis are higher in men than in women (Barajas, Ochoa, Obiols & Lalucat-Jo, 
2015). The mean age of study participants ranged from 23.3 to 51.1 years. Five studies 
reported on the ethnicity of their participants and recruited individuals from a range of 
ethnic groups (Caucasian (M= 45%), African American (M= 42%), Asian (M= 4%), 
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Hispanic (M= 4%), Mixed race (M=2%) and ‘Other racial group’ (M= 3%)). Two studies 
recruited participants from the United States of America, 17 from European countries, two 
from countries in Asia and one study did not specify where they recruited their participants 
from. 
Analysis of treatment effect  
To evaluate treatment effects across RCT’s, effect sizes were obtained, or 
calculated, where possible (Shadish, Robinson, & Lu, 1999). Table 2 depicts either 
reported or calculated effect sizes from the RCT’s included in the review. Effect sizes were 
interpreted according to Cohen’s (1988) definition of an effect size, as follows: d =0.20 as 
a small effect, around d = 0.50 as a medium effect, and around d =0.80 as a large effect. 
 
Table 2. Effect sizes and methodological quality of included RCT’s 
  Effect size (d) 
Study & 
Quality rating  
Bias 
measured 
Post 
treatment 
1-4 wk 1 mo – 
3 mo 
3 mo-  
6 mo 
Metacognitive training 
(MCT) 
     
Aghotor et al. (2010) 
Strong 
 
JTC (decision 
after one 
sentence- 
BADE) 
-0.31    
Pos et al. (2018) 
Strong 
 
JTC (decision 
before two 
beads; 85:15 
ratio) 
-0.25    
Garety et al. (2015) 
Moderate  
JTC (number 
of beads; 
60:40 ratio) 
 
Belief 
flexibility 
-possibility of 
being 
mistaken  
-alternative 
explanations 
-hypothetical 
-0.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.19 
 
0.44 
 
0.14 
-0.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.39 
 
0.59 
 
-0.02 
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contradiction 
Gaweda et al (2015) 
Moderate 
JTC (draws to 
decision; 
80:20 ratio) 
ToM 
CBQ 
-0.18 
  
 
 0.31 
-0.83 
   
Kuokkanen et al. (2014) 
Strong 
JTC (decision 
after first fish; 
80:20 ratio) 
-0.59  -0.15 0.00 
Moritz et al. (2011) 
Strong 
JTC (draws to 
decision; 
80:20 ratio) 
-0.52    
Moritz et al. (2015a) 
Moderate 
JTC (draws to 
decision; 
80:20 ratio) 
-0.41   n/a 
 
Ochoa et al. (2017) 
Strong 
JTC (85:15 
beads task; 
decision after 
one or two 
beads) 
 
 
 
ToM 
 
Attribution 
bias (IPSAQ): 
 
-Externalizing 
-personalizing  
n./a (sig.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
 
 
-0.07 
-0.24 
  n/a  
(non 
sig.) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.34 
 
 
 
 
-0.08 
-0.56 
So et al. (2015) 
Strong 
JTC (draws to 
decision; 
60:40 ratio) 
 
Belief 
flexibility 
 
-hypothetical 
contradiction 
-possibility 
mistaken 
-0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
>0.8 
 
>0.8 
 -0.26  
Social Cognitive Skills 
Training (SCST) 
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Horan et al. (2011) 
(SCST) 
Strong 
Attribution 
bias 
 
-hostility 
-aggression 
-blame 
 
 ToM 
 
 
 
-0.2 
0.00 
-0.19 
 
0.19 
   
Horan et al. (2009)  
(SCST) 
Moderate 
Attribution 
bias 
 
-hostility 
-intention 
-blame 
 
ToM (TASIT) 
 
 
 
-0.11 
-0.46 
-0.06 
 
0.14 
   
Fernandez-Gonzalo et al. 
(2015) 
(adapted SCST) 
Strong  
ToM 
-eyes task 
-hinting task 
 
Attribution 
bias (IPSAQ) 
Externalising 
personalising 
 
0.33 
0.23 
 
 
 
-1.09  
 0.00 
   
Social Cognition and 
Interaction Training (SCIT) 
     
Wang et al. (2013)  
(SCIT) 
Strong 
ToM 
(affective): 
 
Eyes task 
-mind reading 
-gender 
recognition 
 
Attribution 
style (ASQ) 
positive 
scores: 
externality 
stability 
globality 
 
Negative 
scores:  
-externality 
-stability 
-globality 
 
    
 
 
 
1.22 
0.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.29   
-0.51  
-0.20 
 
 
 
-0.20  
-0.35  
-0.20 
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Taylor et al. (2016) 
(SCIT) 
Strong 
ToM  
 
Attribution 
style  
-hostility 
0.59 
 
 
 
-0.50 
   
Roberts et al. (2014) 
(SCIT) 
Strong 
Cognitive 
ToM  
-hinting task 
-TASIT 
 
Affective 
ToM 
-hostility 
-aggression 
 
 
0.11 
0.01 
 
 
 
-0.25 
-0.17 
  
 
0.24 
-0.09 
 
 
 
-0.48 
-0.15 
 
Cognitive bias correction 
programme (CBC)  
     
Moritz et al. (2015b) 
Strong 
JTC (80:20 
ratio) 
-decision after 
1st fish 
-decision after 
1st/2nd fish  
 
 
 
-0.63 
 
-0.51 
   
Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) 
     
Khazaal et al. (2015) 
Strong 
Belief 
flexibility 
-evidence 
against belief 
   
 
0.63 
 
 
0.89 
Waller at al. (2015) 
Moderate 
 
 
Belief 
flexibility:  
-Probability 
mistaken 
(MADS) 
 
 
 
0.85 
 
  
1.01 
(6w) 
 
0.42 
(8w) 
 
Emotion and ToM Imitation 
training (ETIT)  
     
Pino et al. (2015) 
(ETIT) 
Strong 
Cognitive 
ToM 
 
Social 
situation task  
-norm 
violation  
-extent of 
violation 
 
Affective 
ToM: 
-Eyes task 
2.4 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.04 
 
 
 
0.82 
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-Attribution 
task 
0.97 
Mazza et al. (2010) 
(ETIT) 
Moderate 
Cognitive 
ToM  
Affective 
ToM 
1.14 
 
0.79 
   
Video Cognitive Therapy 
(VCT)  
     
Kayser et al. (2006) 
(VCT) 
Weak 
Affective 
ToM  
-attribution 
errors 
 
 
-0.62 
   
Theory of Mind 
Intervention (ToMI) and 
SCST 
     
Bechi et al (2015) 
 
(ToMI)  
 
 
(SCST) 
 
Strong 
 
 
ToMI: 
ToM 
 
SCST: 
ToM 
 
 
 
0.27 
 
 
0.48 
   
 
Treatment effect by intervention type 
All but three of the studies compared a single treatment modality with a control 
condition. These included CBT (Khazaal et al, 2015; Waller et al., 2015), SCIT (Wang et 
al, 2013; Taylor et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2014) SCST (Horan et al., 2009; Fernandez-
Gonzalo et al., 2015), MCT (Aghotor et al., 2010; Pos et al., 2018; So et al., 2015, Ochoa et 
al., 2017; Moritz et al., 2011, Gaweda et al., 2015; Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Garety et al., 
2015), ETIT (Pino et al., 2015; Mazza et al., 2015), CBC (Moritz et al., 2015b) and VCT 
(Kayser et al., 2006). Three studies used a two-arm intervention design, with one study 
comparing MCT with a neurocognitive remediation intervention (NR) and a control 
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condition (Moritz et al., 2015a), the second comparing SCST with a hybrid SCST and NR 
condition and an illness management group (Horan et al., 2011), and the third comparing 
SCST and a ToMI with a control group (Bechi et al., 2015). In the first two cases, the 
cognitive intervention was compared with control intervention only. In the third case, both 
the SCST and ToMI treatment groups (as stand-alone cognitive interventions) were 
compared with control participants only.  
Intervention types 
In all but two cases (Fernandez-Gonzalo et al. 2015; Horan et al., 2011) the treatment 
group outperformed the control condition across all modalities. Nine interventions 
produced medium-large effect size across most outcome measures post-intervention 
(Kayser et al., 2006; Khazaal et al., 2015; Mazza et al., 2010; Pino et al., 2015; Waller at 
al., 2015; So et al., 2015; Moritz et al., 2011; Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Taylor et al., 2016). 
The remaining 13 studies reported small-moderate effect sizes across a number of 
reasoning biases. Effectiveness by intervention type is explored in the section below.  
 
Metacognitive Training (MCT). MCT is a manualized group training program 
(which can also be delivered individually) for individuals with psychosis (Moritz & 
Woodward, 2007). The primary aim of MCT is to teach individuals about cognitive 
distortions and to raise awareness of the dysfunctionality of these biases. The treatment 
focuses on the cognitive biases involved in the formation and maintenance of psychotic 
symptoms, such as attribution biases and the JTC bias, as well as targeting negative 
schemas and dysfunctional coping styles (eg., rumination), which foster depression and 
impaired social cognition. The MCT exercises aim to provide corrective experiences and 
teach patients alternative information-processing and coping strategies, in an engaging and 
experiential manner.  
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In general, MCT studies reported small-to-medium effect sizes post intervention 
(ranging from d= -0.02 to d=0.83; Aghotor et al., 2010; Pos et al., 2018; Garety et al., 
2015; Gaweda et al., 2015; Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2011; Moritz et al., 
2015a; Ochoa et al., 2017; So et al., 2015). Small-to-moderate improvements in the JTC 
bias were generally observed across studies. This bias continued to improve over time in 
two instances (Garety et al., 2015; So et al., 2015), however, two studies found that these 
improvements deteriorated during the follow-up period (Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Ochoa et 
al., 2017). Koukkanen and colleagues (2014) speculated that their eight-session, group 
MCT intervention was sufficient for short-term improvement in JTC; however a longer-
term therapy may be required for longer-lasting change. Where improvements continued 
during the follow-up period, the researchers adjusted their MCT programme to target 
reasoning biases more intensively, including personally-relevant material (Garety et al., 
2015), as well as delivering their intervention individually rather than in a group (So et al., 
2015). As the relevance of psychological treatment to the patient has been found to affect 
engagement, and consequently outcome (Freeman et al., 2013), it may well be that 
personalising the interventions leads to longer-lasting improvements, though this warrants 
further research attention. 
Improvements in belief flexibility and attribution biases varied across studies. 
Ochoa et al (2017) reported slight improvements in the experimental group post-treatment 
in both externalizing and personalizing attribution biases compared with controls (d=0.07; 
d=0.24 respectively). Interestingly, the researchers found that the personalizing attribution 
bias continued to improve during the follow-up period (d= -0.56) whereas the degree of 
externalizing bias remained the same over time. This finding suggests that certain 
attribution biases may be differentially responsive to MCT, though further research is 
needed into this. Where ToM ability was measured, findings were also mixed across 
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studies (Gaweda et al., 2015; Ochoa et al., 2017), and observed improvements were modest 
at best (d=0.34; Ochoa et al., 2017). It could be argued that the generalised nature of MCT 
may not sufficiently address the complex cognitive processes associated with ToM 
abilities. 
Social Cognitive Skills Training (SCST). SCST is an intervention that addresses 
emotional processing, social perception, attribution biases, and ToM deficits in individuals 
with psychosis (Horan et al., 2009). During the treatment, participants are taught a number 
of skills, which gradually increase in their complexity, via a PowerPoint presentation. This 
is done by breaking down complex social cognitive processes into their component parts, 
and helping individuals to become more familiar with these skills through repetition and 
practice. Each session includes a review of previous material, the presentation of new 
material and interactive training exercises to help consolidate learning. 
Treatment outcomes for the SCST interventions were mixed (Horan et al., 2011, 
Horan et al., 2009; Fernandez-Gonzalo et al., 2015). Two studies utilising longer-term 
SCST reported improvements in ToM abilities in study participants (Bechi et al., 2015, 
d=0.48, 18 sessions; Fernandez-Gonzalo et al., 2015, d=0.33, 4-5months of sessions). 
Interestingly, those treatments that were shorter in duration reported less impressive 
changes in reasoning biases post-therapy (Horan et al., 2011, d= 0.19, 12 sessions; Horan et 
al., 2009, d= 0.14, 16 sessions). As stated by Horan and colleagues (2011), it may be that 
ToM-related concepts are difficult to define and translate into brief, structured training 
exercises. The researchers highlighted the need for longer-term, more innovative 
approaches to address these more complex features of social communication. None of the 
studies reviewed incorporated follow-up assessments, so the longer-term impact of the 
therapy on ToM deficits cannot be established. The review also found that SCST resulted 
in some improvements in attribution biases across studies, although findings are mixed. 
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Small improvements were detected in hostility (d= -0.2; Horan et al., 2011) and blame (d=-
0.19; Horan et al., 2011) attributions in the studies reviewed.  
Social Cognition and Interaction Training (SCIT). SCIT is an 18-24 session, 
manual-based, interactive therapy designed to improve social functioning in individuals 
with psychosis (Roberts, Penn & Combs, 2006). SCIT has shown feasibility and 
preliminary evidence of efficacy in both inpatient (Penn et al., 2005) and outpatient groups 
(Roberts & Penn, 2009). The treatment, which is designed to improve emotion perception, 
attribution biases and ToM abilities, is divided into three phases: emotion training, figuring 
out situations and integration. During emotion training, the therapist delivers psycho-
education around emotions and highlights how they link with thoughts and situations. The 
aim of the ‘figuring out’ stage is to teach patients about a number of cognitive biases and 
highlight how these may be inaccurate and unhelpful. During the final integration phase, 
the patients put into practice what they have learnt using real-world examples. This is done 
through discussing and reflecting on troubling interpersonal events, analysing social-
cognitive stimuli (eg., videos) or through role-plays with the therapist or other patients.   
 Compared with SCST, studies delivering SCIT reported more encouraging effect 
sizes post-treatment on measures of cognitive and affective ToM (Wang et al., 2013, 
d=1.22; Taylor et al., 2016, d=0.50). Two studies included follow-up assessments up to six-
months post treatment, whereby biases continued to improve in some cases (Roberts et al., 
2014). This finding suggests that changes in reasoning biases could take some time to 
establish before they manifest. Further, following SCIT there were larger improvements in 
attribution biases such as hostility (Taylor et al., 2016; d= -0.5) compared with those 
reported following the SCST interventions (Horan et al., 2011, d= -0.2; Horan et al., 2009, 
d= -0.11). In light of these findings, it could be speculated that experiential interventions 
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(SCIT) are more effective than education-focused treatments (SCST) in ameliorating 
reasoning biases, though this warrants further research attention. 
Cognitive bias correction programme (CBC). The CBC programme is a self-
directed, psycho-educational intervention (Moritz et al., 2015b). Rather than specifically 
addressing the reasoning biases implicated in psychosis, the intervention aims to teach 
individuals about a wide range of common cognitive biases. The aim of the treatment is to 
demonstrate to patients the imperfection of human cognition in more general terms and 
thus plant a seed of doubt for overconfident and biased judgements. The CBC program is 
organised into six chapters, consisting of 30 exercises, delivered using PowerPoint 
presentations. During most of the exercises used, participants perform tasks that usually 
elicit biased responses, are then informed about any mistakes they have made, and are 
finally instructed on how these errors in thinking can be corrected.  
The CBC programme led to moderate improvements in the JTC bias in the 
experimental group (Moritz et al., 2015b). The researchers used ‘decision after 1st fish’ 
(d=-0.63) and decision after 1st or 2nd fish (d=-0.51) to assess change in this bias. A follow-
up assessment was not conducted, so the longer-term implications for this treatment are not 
known. A limitation of this therapy is that it excludes the mention of psychosis and 
delusion-relevant cognitive biases. Personalising the material could result in larger 
improvements in reasoning biases, though this warrants further research attention. Finally, 
the study recruited a higher proportion of males compared with females, and all of the 
participants were outpatients. In light of this, the findings from the current study should be 
generalised to other groups with caution.  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; ‘Michael’s Game’ and the ‘Thinking 
Well’ intervention). Khazaal and colleagues (2015) highlighted that much of the research 
exploring the efficacy of CBT has focused on interventions delivered in specialized settings 
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with highly selected participants. A number of preliminary studies have shown, however, 
that new approaches to treatment, that integrate CBT techniques in game format (Khazaal 
et al., 2011) or computer-assisted, virtual reality therapies (Freeman et al., 2016) represent 
promising treatment for patients with psychosis. In light of this, Khazaal and colleagues 
(2015) devised Michael’s Game, a 12-session, group-based hypothetical reasoning training 
programme devised to promote the dissemination of CBT in clinical settings. The aim of 
the game is to train individuals to find and consider alternative hypotheses for any given 
situation, in order to facilitate belief flexibility and thus reduce delusional conviction. This 
is achieved by encouraging group participants to collectively help the fictive character 
(Michael) to find alternatives to the conclusions that he draws from situations described on 
each card. The cards used in Michael’s Game contain impersonal information that may 
reflect the participants’ own concerns in order to facilitate generalization. 
The ‘Thinking Well’ programme was developed by Waller and colleagues (2015), 
and is a six-session intervention with a particular emphasis on reasoning-focused CBT. 
During the first couple of sessions, participants complete the Maudsley Review Training 
Programme (MRTP; Waller, Freeman, Jolley, Dunn & Garety, 2011), which is then 
followed by four individualised sessions of reasoning-focused CBT. The MRTP is a 
computerised training programme which aims to describe and normalise specific reasoning 
biases (belief flexibility and JTC) and teaches people how to identify and change these 
biases through the use of five training tasks. The subsequent CBT sessions are then 
delivered face-to-face by trained therapists, and are tailored to the individuals’ specific 
delusional belief. Another aim of the therapy is to work towards a selected personal goal. 
The therapy is delivered individually and was developed to help treat individuals with 
moderate-to-severe delusions. 
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 CBT-informed treatments were effective at encouraging belief flexibility in 
psychosis patients (Khazaal et al., 2015; Waller et al., 2015). The impact of the therapy on 
other reasoning biases was not reported in either study. Khazaal and colleagues (2015) 
found that post-treatment, the experimental group displayed substantially more belief 
flexibility compared with control participants (d=.64). In addition, Waller et al (2015) 
reported that following the ‘Thinking Well’ intervention, participants in the experimental 
group were substantially more likely to consider that they were mistaken in their 
persecutory belief compared with controls (d= .85). In light of this, however, Waller and 
colleagues used an opportunistic sampling method, whereby they recruited participants 
from a previous study of theirs who were motivated to engage in research. This may limit 
the generalisability of the findings to typical patient groups. Interestingly, both studies 
reported improvements in belief flexibility following the end of treatment (Khazaal et al., 
2015, d= .89; Waller et al., 2015; d= 1.01), however these effects were not sustained at 
longer-term follow-up in Waller et al’s study. In response to this, the authors stated that 
they were planning to extend their therapy programme from four to eight sessions, and that 
they had consulted participant feedback data in order to refine and improve the intervention 
(eg., further personalising the therapy exercises). 
 
Theory of Mind (ToM) interventions.  
Emotion and ToM Imitation training (ETIT). ETIT is a group-based, 12-week 
treatment, designed to improve social cognition in individuals with psychosis. Studies have 
shown that patients with schizophrenia who display ToM deficits also show significant 
impairments on all imitation tasks. Further, research has shown that imitation errors are 
significantly associated with reduced social competence and negative symptoms (Mazza et 
al., 2010). Mazza and colleagues suggested that through observing and imitating other 
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people’s actions, intentions and emotions (whereby the observer experiences the same 
intention or emotion as the observed, a phenomenon they coined ‘embodied simulation’), 
an individuals’ ability to take on another person’s perspective is improved. The treatment 
involves observing others’ eye direction, imitating facial expressions, inferring others’ 
mental states and making attributions of intentions based on the actions of others through 
the use of video clips, pictures and comic strips. 
Video Cognitive Therapy (VCT). The VCT intervention (Kayser et al., 2006) is a 
brief therapy consisting of two, one-hour training sessions delivered over a one-week 
period. The therapy was designed to help individuals with psychosis to accurately interpret 
other peoples’ mental states and thus develop ToM abilities. During the training sessions, 
patients are encouraged to be more attentive to the general context of each scene during 
their analysis of the characters’ behaviour and mental state. The intervention utilises movie 
clips showing two or more people interacting with one another as therapy material. The 
different mental states depicted by the characters in the clips include hostility, surprise and 
disappointment. After viewing the clips, the therapist provides a brief description of the 
general situation shown in the scene. Patients are then encouraged to give a spontaneous 
description and commentary of what they have seen. Where individuals offered 
spontaneous interpretations of the characters’ behaviour and the mental state that may have 
motivated it, these interpretations and hypotheses are discussed (eg., through examining the 
evidence for and against their hypothesis).   
Theory of Mind Intervention (ToMI).The ToMI (Bechi et al., 2015) is a group 
intervention consisting of five modules, delivered over 18, weekly sessions. The 
intervention uses comic strips and cartoons depicting social interactions as training 
material. The modules are delivered in increasing order of complexity, with the first three 
modules focusing on cognitive ToM and the last two on affective ToM. Assuming that 
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ToM difficulties in schizophrenia are associated with an inability to extract relevant data 
from the context (Frith & Corcoran, 1996), the intervention trains patients to recognize 
relevant details, to collect every meaningful piece of information they have seen (for eg., 
characters’ actions and physical features), to read the corresponding verbal part of comic 
strips and to identify the literal meaning. Patients are then asked to interpret hidden 
meanings using all the information they have collected and to further hypothesize 
interpretations, based on expressed emotions, the relationships between characters, the 
implied motivations and the character’s mental state.  
 
 In general, larger improvements in ToM were observed following the ToM-specific 
interventions compared with other, more broad-based interventions (Taylor et al., 2016; 
Horan et al., 2009). The ETIT intervention was the most effective in improving ToM 
abilities following therapy. Study participants showed large improvements in both 
cognitive (Mazza et al., 2010; d=1.14; Pino et al., 2015 d=2.0) and affective (Pino et al., 
2015, d= 0.82, 0.97; Mazza et al., 2010, d= 0.78) ToM abilities. In light of this, however, 
neither study incorporated follow-up assessments so the long-term durability of these 
improvements cannot be deduced.  
In addition to this, participants who received the VCT intervention also 
demonstrated large improvements in ToM abilities compared with controls (Kayser et al., 
2006, d=-0.69). In light of this, however, the studies reviewed had a number of 
methodological limitations. The VCT intervention is novel and is not manualized, and 
these findings have not been replicated. Further the researchers in this study were not blind 
to participant allocation which could have introduced bias. Finally, participants displayed 
much smaller improvements in ToM following the ToMI intervention (Bechi et al., 2015; 
d= 0.27). It could be speculated that this may be due to the fact that the ToMI is a slightly 
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shorter intervention (nine weeks in duration) compared with the 12-week interventions 
delivered by the other ToM-specific therapies (Mazza et al., 2010; Pino et al., 2015). It may 
well be individuals need sufficient time to digest and practice the learnt strategies before 
improvements are visible. 
 
Results by intervention characteristics  
Intervention procedure. An examination of the therapy format or setting may help 
to identify best practices for interventions targeting reasoning biases in individuals with 
psychosis. Although self-directed, online interventions may be helpful when participants 
have difficulty accessing outpatient centres, the efficacy of these interventions was 
somewhat mixed. One study testing the efficacy of a self-directed MCT intervention 
(Moritz et al., 2015a) reported small changes in the JTC bias immediately after treatment 
(d= -0.34). These findings could be due to a lack of full adherence to treatment, a lack of 
motivation but also perhaps due to the lack of follow-up. Interestingly, another study led by 
the same researcher (Moritz et al., 2011) reported much larger changes in JTC (d= -0.54) 
when delivering MCT in a therapist-led, face-to-face setting. It could be that face-to-face 
interventions are more effective, although it is noted that two studies which adopted this 
intervention style also reported modest effect sizes (Aghotor et al., 2010, d= -0.31; Pos et 
al., 2018, d= -0.25).  
Comparatively, there were no noticeable differences between individually-delivered 
and group-based interventions. When considering intervention setting (inpatient vs. 
community), there did not appear to be any significant difference in treatment efficacy 
across therapies. It is of note, however, that twelve studies recruited their participants from 
outpatient or community settings. The three studies that recruited from inpatient settings 
only applied a significant number of exclusion criteria such as significant substance misuse, 
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co-morbid diagnoses, suspiciousness or thought disorder, or other difficulties that would 
impair engagement in the group (Taylor et al., 2016; Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Aghotor et 
al., 2010). This has important implications for the generalisibility of the findings to 
individuals presenting with more complex and severe symptoms. 
Outcome measurements. Interestingly, there were noticeable differences in the 
changes observed using self-report and performance-based measures of reasoning, 
indicating that different aspects of reasoning may be captured by these tools. For example, 
Gaweda and colleagues (2015) reported a large effect size (d= -0.74) when using a self-
report measure (CBQ) to detect changes in the JTC bias following MCT. In contrast, when 
using a performance-based measure of JTC (the “Fish Task”) the researchers reported 
much smaller improvements (d=-0.18). Further, there were differences in the ways by 
which certain measurement tools were used to assess change in reasoning biases across 
studies. For example, five studies assessed change in the JTC bias by the number of beads 
drawn before a decision is made (Moritz et al., 2015a; Garety et al., 2015; Moritz et al., 
2011; Gaweda et al., 2015; So et al., 2015), whereas five studies compared the percentage 
of participants in each group making a decision after the first or second bead/sentence 
(Aghotor et al., 2010; Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Pos et al., 2018; Ochoa et al., 2017; Moritz 
et al., 2015b). Furthermore, there were differences across studies in the proportions of 
different coloured beads in each jar, with two studies using a 60:40 beads ratio (more 
difficult) (Garety et al., 2015; So et al., 2015), five using an 80:20 ratio (Gaweda et al., 
2015; Kuokkanen et al., 2014; Moritz et al., 2011; Moritz et al., 2015a; Moritz et al., 
2015b) and two using an 85:15 beads ratio (easier) (Pos et al., 2018; Ochoa et al. (2017). 
Follow-up assessment points. Seven of the 22 studies included in the review 
conducted follow-up analyses. Interestingly, it appears that where studies have included 
follow-up assessments, belief flexibility scores in particular tended to improve over time. 
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For example, Khazaal and colleagues (2015), who tested the efficacy of a group, CBT-
based intervention, reported larger improvements in belief flexibility after six-months 
compared with at three-months post treatment. (d= 0.63 vs. d=0.89). Similar effects were 
described in Garety et al’s (2015) MCT study, whereby improvements in belief flexibility 
continued once the treatment had finished (d= 0.44 post-treatment to d=0.59 at two-week 
follow-up). 
In one case, the length of treatment follow-up made the difference between 
significant and non-significant results. Waller and colleagues (2015) assessed outcomes 
immediately after therapy and again at six weeks and eight weeks post-treatment. Large 
changes in belief flexibility were reported six weeks post treatment (d=1.01), however this 
improvement started to decline at the eight-week assessment point (d=0.42). This finding 
highlights the potential need for further intervention (eg., a follow-up, one off ‘refresher’ 
session) once treatment is complete in order to maintain treatment gains over time.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
It is widely acknowledged that reasoning biases contribute to both the development and 
maintenance of paranoia. In view of the significant impact that these biases can have on 
daily functioning, many cognitive interventions have been developed to ameliorate these 
deficits. The impact of these interventions on the positive and negative symptoms of 
psychosis has been studied at length in the literature. In contrast, the efficacy of these 
interventions on reasoning biases, both in the short-term and the long-term, has received 
less research attention. In light of this, the current review compared a number of different 
cognitive therapies on their efficacy in ameliorating these biases, as well as exploring 
whether certain biases were more or less responsive to treatment. The review revealed that 
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there are a number of cognitive interventions available which have shown promise in 
improving outcomes. Targeted treatments appear to be more effective than broad-based 
interventions at improving specific reasoning biases, although this warrants further research 
attention. Generally, robust improvements were reported in belief flexibility and ToM 
abilities following treatment. Improvements in the JTC and attribution biases were less 
consistent, though present in most cases. Conclusions were limited by factors such as a lack 
of follow-up assessments and differences in measurement tools used across studies.  
Research design 
RCT’s are considered the gold standard for testing intervention efficacy (Cook, 
Campbell & Shadish, 2002). Whilst all of the reviewed studies adopted an RCT design, the 
quality of the studies varied, and this is likely to influence the confidence with which 
conclusions can be drawn from the findings. All studies randomly assigned participants to 
intervention and control groups, in order to reduce allocation bias and to balance known 
and unknown factors in the assignment of treatments. In light of this, however, in some 
cases the methods used to do this were not adequately described. Further, in order to ensure 
that the effects observed are attributable to treatment effect, high-quality trials often include 
an ‘active’ control condition, as was implemented by 10 studies in this review. This type of 
control condition is employed to account for non-specific treatment factors that may 
account for changes in the outcomes measured, including therapeutic contact or social 
interaction with other patients. Active comparison conditions may also reduce attrition 
rates when utilizing RCT’s (Da Paz & Wallander, 2017). 
In contrast, over half of the studies reviewed included a TAU or wait-list control 
group. The conditions of these control groups were described as including general psycho-
education, computer training, different social activities and individual support. One study 
which utilised a TAU design reported twice as many drop-outs in the control condition, 
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with most dropping out for ‘unknown reasons’ and several discontinuing due to a 
worsening of their psychosis (Khazaal et al., 2015). Further, Wang and colleagues (2013) 
compared participants receiving a 20-week group SCIT intervention with those placed on a 
waiting list. Out of the 21 participants on the waiting-list, four of these were lost at follow-
up. Two of these participants were hospitalized whilst waiting for the intervention and two 
participants took up other therapy programmes. In contrast, all 22 participants in the SCIT 
intervention remained engaged at follow-up. This was not the case in all TAU control 
designs, however, (Moritz et al., 2015a), and in one case where drop-out rates were much 
lower, monetary compensation was offered (Moritz et al., 2011). These findings may have 
important implications for the design of future research studies. 
Reporting effect sizes 
Of the 22 studies reviewed only 13 reported effects sizes across all assessment points. 
For the remaining nine studies, effect sizes were calculated from the available information. 
As research on cognitive interventions for individuals with psychosis becomes more 
widespread, researchers should routinely report effect sizes for all outcomes studied. 
Outcome measurement 
 The choice of measurement tool used to detect change in reasoning biases could 
influence the findings that were reported. For example, the JTC bias was assessed using the 
‘beads/fish task’ by most researchers; however, studies have shown that the beads task may 
have significant methodological limitations (Ross, McKay, Colheart & Langdon, 2015). 
For example, research has shown that the beads task lacks ecological validity, is rarely 
incentivised and individual motivation might explain some differences in performance 
(Jacoby, Abramowitz, Buck & Fabricant, 2014). These factors could partly account for the 
small effect sizes reported in the review. Further, substantial differences were found 
between self-report and performance-based measures of reasoning (Gaweda et al., 2015). 
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Whilst it is widely acknowledged that self-report measures are more susceptible to bias, it 
has also been suggested that performance-based measures could be more sensitive to the 
functional changes that may follow cognitive interventions (Elliott & Fiszdon, 2014). With 
regards to the selection of appropriate measures, the findings of this review have important 
implications for future research studies in this field. 
In addition, there were differences in the ways by which measurement tools were used 
to assess change in reasoning biases across studies, which may limit the extent to which the 
findings can be compared. For example, some studies measured change in the JTC bias by 
assessing the number of beads drawn before a decision is made, whereas others compared 
the percentage of participants in each group making a decision after the first or second 
bead. Further, there were differences across studies in the proportions of coloured beads 
present in each jar, with some using a 60:40 beads ratio (more difficult) and others using an 
85:15 beads ratio (easier). In the ‘higher ratio’ instances (when the ratio of beads is 85:15), 
it could be argued that very few beads need to be drawn for the probability of one of the 
jars to be very high. Therefore, if a participant asks to see only a small number of beads, 
participants may not be ‘jumping to conclusions on the basis of insufficient evidence’. 
Finally, whilst many studies ensured that both patients and clinicians were unaware 
of which treatment was given until the study was completed in order to limit bias, several 
studies did not (Garety et al., 2015; Gaweda et al., 2015; Kayser et al., 2006; Waller at al., 
2015). Thus, some reported results may be biased by demand characteristics and efforts 
should be made to ensure that participants and assessors are blinded in future studies.  
Sample formation 
Researchers used a number of recruitment methods in an attempt to obtain a sample 
representative of the target population; however, in some cases selection bias may have 
occurred. For example, several researchers recruited individuals to take part in their 
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research study who had taken part in a previous study (Waller et al., 2015), had previously 
explained they were happy to be contacted by researchers to take part in research trials, or 
were already attending support group programmes (Gaweda et al., 2015). This may have 
resulted in the inclusion of help-seeking, and perhaps more motivated and insightful 
participants who were more agreeable to services. Research has shown that cognitive 
insight is associated with good outcomes in CBT for psychosis (Perivoliotis et al., 2010) 
and poor insight has been found to be related to low treatment adherence (Rüsch & 
Corrigan, 2002). It could be hypothesised that less motivated and insightful individuals 
may not engage as well in the therapy, and thus improvements in reasoning biases may not 
be observed to as much of an extent. 
Additionally, where research was conducted in an inpatient setting, a number of 
exclusion criteria were applied which may limit the generalizabilty of the findings. For 
example, Taylor and colleagues (2016) described excluding participants who may find 
engagement with a group format difficult. This included participants who were on high 
doses of medication and those who displayed continuous aggressive behaviour. Another 
inpatient study reported that otherwise eligible participants had to be excluded from the 
treatment due to an inability to consent (Koukkanen et al., 2016). These findings suggest 
that patients who were acutely psychotic were not likely to be approached, nor represented, 
by the population under study. These factors may have implications for the feasibility of 
the delivery of these interventions in settings such as inpatient units, where patients are 
frequently detained under section and are often acutely unwell.  
Generalizability of results  
There are several factors which may limit the extent to which the study findings can 
be generalized. As with other areas of psychological treatment research, studies recruiting 
individuals with psychosis often apply strict eligibility criteria which can rule out patients 
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with a variety of psychiatric and medical co-morbidities. Several studies excluded 
individuals with co-existing substance misuse and alcohol difficulties (Garety et al., 2015; 
Horan et al., 2009), mental health difficulties (Bechi et al., 2015), patients showing severe 
signs of hostility, megalomania, formal thought disorder and suspiciousness (Aghotor et al., 
2010) and those with an IQ of less than 70 (Moritz et al., 2011). This limits the extent to 
which the findings can be generalized to typical psychosis populations in both inpatient and 
community settings, who may present with more complex and severe difficulties. The 
exclusion of participants with substance use disorders is particularly significant, since over 
40% of psychosis patients are likely to experience substance misuse difficulties at some 
point (Kavanagh, McGrath, Saunders, Dore & Clark, 2002).  
Most of the studies included in the review recruited participants from largely white-
majority, western countries. Of particular note, was that a large percentage of the sample 
was made up of ethnic minority groups (55%), with most of these participants identifying 
as Black African, Black Caribbean or Black other (42%). These findings are somewhat in 
line with previous research, reporting high rates of psychosis in ethnic minorities, in 
particular in those who identify as Black African and Black Caribbean (Veling et al., 2007), 
with one study reporting a risk between four- and six fold that of the White-British 
population (Kirkbride et al., 2008). The sizeable percentage of Caucasian individuals 
recruited (45%) could have been down to chance, or as a result of other factors such as 
barriers to help-seeking amongst ethnic minorities. Taking these factors into account, the 
sample partly reflects a ‘true’ psychosis sample in terms of ethnicity, however; only five of 
the 22 studies reported on the ethnicity of their participants, so these figures should be 
interpreted with caution.  
Finally, the mean age of study participants ranged from 23.3-51.1 years, with many 
studies reporting that most of their participants were in the 30-50 years age bracket. In light 
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of this, generalizing to a more diverse sample may prove difficult. For example, cognitive 
interventions with older adults may be complicated by factors such as neurodegenerative 
decline (Folsom et al., 2006). Further, although not explicitly stated, most studies included 
in this review can be thought of as treating residual, more chronic psychotic symptoms 
(Cosci & Fava, 2012). In future research, it would be of interest to review studies looking 
at reasoning interventions across the continuum of psychosis, including those in the general 
population, and in “at risk” psychosis populations. This could provide insight into the 
phenomenology and efficacy of the treatment of reasoning biases at different stages of 
psychosis. Finally, many studies recruited participants with a variety of diagnoses and 
symptom profiles, introducing the problem of heterogeneity.  
Intervention fidelity and process 
Generally, researchers put in place a number of measures to ensure treatment 
fidelity. For example, where therapy was delivered face-to-face, several researchers video-
taped sessions and conducted direct observations of those delivering the treatment. Further, 
a number of studies reported that trial therapists received specialist training in the therapy, 
or that the therapy was delivered by an expert in the field (So et al., 2015; Wang et al., 
2013; Waller et al., 2015). With online, self-directed interventions, it is somewhat harder to 
ensure that all participants are receiving the intervention as intended. Researchers 
attempted to ensure treatment fidelity in these cases by, for example, sending out e-mail 
reminders encouraging participants to use the programme on a regular basis (Moritz et al., 
2015b). In light of this, however, for their online CBC intervention, Moritz and colleagues 
(2015b) reported that just 23 out of the 29 respondents (79%) in the experimental group 
read all of the treatment modules, with one participant disclosing that they had not read any 
of the presentations.   
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It could be speculated that self-directed interventions may be associated with a 
reduced motivation to engage in treatment. Moritz and colleagues (2015a) gave participants 
access to their six-week online MCT training programme for up to one year. The 
researchers started with 30 experimental participants at baseline, this decreased to 20 
participants six weeks, post-intervention, and to 14 participants at their three-month follow 
up. The researchers highlighted that perhaps a lack of motivation, often ameliorated by 
therapeutic contact, could have had an impact on engagement (Andersson & Titov, 2014). 
In light of this, however, the same researchers reported a much higher retention rate when 
testing the effects of an online, six-week CBC intervention on reasoning biases (with 93% 
of the baseline sample completing the post assessment). Further research is needed to 
elucidate the factors that encourage engagement in self-directed treatments.  
Limitations of Review  
A series of scoping exercises were carried out at the start of the review process 
which indicated that a sufficient number of RCT’s matched the proposed inclusion criteria. 
As such, it was decided that the review would only include studies adhering to this design. 
These studies typically provide a higher quality of evidence, and would therefore provide 
more robust findings for synthesis in the review. In light of this, however, it should be 
noted that cognitive interventions not yet tested using an RCT design likely exist, though 
were not represented in the review. Employing less-restrictive inclusion criteria might have 
meant that the findings would have been more representative of the interventions available.  
In addition to this, the current review did not consider broader outcomes such as the 
impact of the change in reasoning biases on other areas such as quality of life, medication 
use and social functioning. Secondary analyses examining the impact of cognitive 
interventions on these domains would provide valuable insights into the broader 
implications of these therapies. Finally, the literature, and therefore the review, may also be 
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subject to publication biases. Positive findings, as opposed to negative findings, are more 
likely to be published (Button et al., 2013), yet both are significant when considering how 
effective an intervention is.  
 
Clinical implications  
Although the studies reviewed varied widely in terms of patient characteristics, 
study design and outcome measurement, several tentative conclusions can be drawn from 
the findings obtained. The review demonstrated that existing cognitive interventions 
improve reasoning biases in individuals with psychosis, and that there is promise for the 
use of these interventions clinically. The findings suggest that where a particular reasoning 
bias is particularly prominent, a specific and more targeted therapy may be more effective 
than a broad-based intervention. A thorough assessment of individual symptoms and 
personal goals would help to determine this. There is also some evidence that personalising 
the therapy material may lead to improved treatment effects, though this warrants further 
research attention. Finally, further research is needed to shed light on the feasibility and 
acceptability of each intervention to individuals with psychosis. 
Future research 
In light of these points, to ensure that clinical practice is informed by appropriate 
clinical research findings, and to clarify further how effective cognitive interventions are in 
treating reasoning biases in psychosis patients, several aims for future research are 
suggested. The delivery of a large number of high-quality studies, evaluating the 
effectiveness of cognitive interventions in a representative sample, would be of use. For 
example, most of the studies included recruited stable participants from outpatient settings, 
so further research is needed into the efficacy of these interventions in more acutely unwell, 
inpatient groups. Further, studies with extended follow-up assessments would be useful to 
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ascertain longer-term treatment effects. There is also a need to determine optimum 
treatment frequency and duration for specific reasoning biases and cognitive therapies. In 
addition, further research is especially warranted into the efficacy of these interventions 
with those in the prodromal stage of psychosis as well as those who are acutely unwell, 
where reasoning biases are prominent and there is a lack of available interventions (Penn, 
Waldheter, Perkins, Mueser & Lieberman, 2005). Finally, there is a need for future studies 
to measure the effectiveness of these interventions on real-world reasoning. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current literature review has found that cognitive interventions targeting reasoning 
biases in individuals with psychosis are generally effective in achieving outcomes. Some of 
these improvements were reported immediately after treatment, whilst others appeared to 
materialize over time. Targeted interventions were comparatively more successful at 
improving specific reasoning biases compared to more general, broad-based therapies. 
Interestingly, SCIT was found to be somewhat more effective than SCST in many cases, 
indicating that an experiential approach could be more valuable than largely psycho-
educational treatments, although this warrants further research attention. In summary, these 
findings help to establish a role for existing psychological interventions in improving 
reasoning biases, as well as the need for the development of tailored psychological 
therapies in this group. The field would benefit from the delivery of studies measuring 
intervention effects on real-world reasoning and studies with follow-up assessments to 
measure longer-term change. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
It is widely acknowledged that a number of factors can influence the way that individuals 
make decisions. Whilst the impact of emotion and beliefs on reasoning in the general 
population has been widely studied, the application of these findings to psychopathology 
has received less research attention. The aim of the current study was to assess logical 
reasoning in highly-paranoid individuals (HP). HP participants were compared with those 
high in social anxiety (SA) and those low in both paranoia and social anxiety (L). In line 
with the hyper-emotion theory (HET), it was predicted that HP and SA participants would 
reason more logically when the syllogism task content was related to their concerns. In 
contrast, belief bias predicted that HP and SA participants would reason in line with their 
beliefs, as opposed to the validity of the conclusions presented, when the task content was 
related to their concerns. Finally, it was predicted that paranoia severity would be 
positively associated with an intuitive thinking style and negatively associated with an 
analytical thinking style, in the HP group. One-hundred and one undergraduate students 
completed a number of questionnaire and experiential measures to assess symptomology 
and thinking style, as well as a syllogistic reasoning task to assess logical reasoning 
abilities. The syllogism conclusions varied according to their content (paranoia-related, 
social anxiety-related, or non-specific), their plausibility (believable/unbelievable) and their 
logical validity (valid/invalid) in order to test the various hypotheses. The study findings 
did not support the predictions made in line with the HET or the belief bias theory. 
Interestingly, there was some evidence that paranoia severity was positively associated 
with an analytical, and to some extent an intuitive, thinking style in the HP group. Study 
limitations, suggestions for future research and the clinical implication of the findings are 
discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
 
A large amount of research has explored the impact of pre-existing beliefs on 
logical reasoning processes (Goel & Dolan, 2003; Goel & Vartanian, 2011). One of the 
most prominent findings is that individuals have a tendency to view information as valid if 
it is in line with their beliefs, and are more likely to reject information as false if it is not. 
This phenomenon is known as the ‘belief bias’ effect, and is one of the most studied in the 
reasoning literature (Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 1993). The cognitive dissonance theory 
offers an explanation for the belief bias phenomenon, stating that we are motivated to not 
act against our beliefs, as doing so could result in a negative emotional state (Harmon-
Jones & Mills, 1999). In everyday life, some degree of belief bias could be considered 
adaptive. For example, in dangerous situations, when capacities are restricted and time is 
limited, it makes sense to rely on our ‘gut instincts’, rather than to stop and consider 
whether our conclusion meets the standards of formal logic (Eliades, Mansell, Andrew, 
Stewart & Blanchette, 2012).  
Researchers have also explored the ways by which emotion can influence logical 
reasoning. A number of studies have found that emotion (both negative and positive) often 
has a detrimental impact on reasoning ability (Goel & Dolan, 2003). Possible explanations 
for this include the additional load on working memory (thought to limit resources 
available to reason logically; Baddeley, 2003), the influence of emotion on motivation to 
solve complex cognitive tasks, as well as emotion influencing how attention is allocated 
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2012). In light of this, however, findings in the literature are 
mixed. A number of studies have found that individuals reason more logically about 
emotive, personally-relevant content compared with neutral content. For example, one 
study looked at logical reasoning in individuals from three different cities shortly after the 
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London terrorist attacks of July 2005 (Blanchette, Richards, Melnyk & Lavda, 2007). 
Individuals in London, who reported the highest levels of emotion, as well as a closer 
proximity to the event, reasoned more logically than participants in Canada when the 
syllogisms were related to terrorism. Thus, it seems that when participants reason about 
personally-relevant emotional topics, logical reasoning abilities may be enhanced 
(Blanchette et al., 2007).  
Whilst there has been much research looking at the impact of beliefs and emotion 
on logical reasoning in healthy individuals, its application to those with psychological 
difficulties is less well-studied. The interplay between emotion, beliefs and logical 
reasoning is of clear relevance to better understanding the dysfunctional beliefs 
characteristic of so many psychological disorders. Historically, it has been understood that 
individuals with psychological disorder reason illogically (Beck, 1976), and a major focus 
of many psychological treatments such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) has been 
to challenge these ‘illogical’ convictions and to replace these beliefs with more rational 
alternatives (Clark & Wells, 1995). There is some evidence for logical reasoning deficits in 
those with psychological difficulties in the literature, although findings are mixed. For 
instance, research has shown that depressed patients (Channon & Baker, 1994) and 
individuals with schizophrenia (Goel, Bartolo, St Clair & Venneri, 2004) perform worse 
than healthy controls on logical reasoning tasks. In contrast, however, one study found no 
differences in logical reasoning between individuals with OCD and healthy controls 
(Pélissier & O' Connor, 2002). Further, a recent study found that when confounding 
variables such as IQ and level of education were controlled for, there were no differences 
between participants with schizophrenia and healthy controls on reasoning ability (Mirian, 
Heinrichs & Vaz, 2011). In light of these findings, emerging theories have suggested that 
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dysfunctional beliefs are not due to illogical thinking per se, and have instead focused on 
the interplay between emotion, beliefs and reasoning processes (Vroling & de Jong, 2010). 
Belief bias and its application to psychological difficulties 
Whilst belief bias has been widely studied in healthy individuals (Trippas, Handley 
& Verde, 2014), its application to psychological difficulties has received less research 
attention. There is some evidence to suggest that individuals with psychological disorder 
show a generally-enhanced belief bias compared with healthy controls (De Jong, 
Weertman, Horselenberg & Van den Hout, 1997). It is hypothesised that the stronger this 
tendency is, the more likely the individual will fail to correct their prior beliefs. In light of 
this, a strong belief bias could act as a barrier to revising the dysfunctional beliefs 
associated with their disorder. In line with this hypothesis, one study found that spider 
phobics displayed a stronger belief bias regarding commonly-held beliefs than non-phobic 
controls (De Jong et al., 1997). In view of this, however, subsequent studies have failed to 
find an association between the strength of the belief bias regarding universal convictions 
and symptoms of generalised anxiety, social anxiety and depression (Smeets & de Jong, 
2005; Vroling & de Jong, 2009). 
In contrast, others have suggested that an enhanced belief bias regarding 
emotionally-relevant rather than global themes may be especially relevant for the 
development of psychological difficulties (Vroling & de Jong, 2010). The theory explains 
that the dysfunctional beliefs typical of so many disorders are likely to elicit fear when 
thought about. It is hypothesised that when individuals are in a situation when a decision 
regarding their fear has to be made, they make a quick decision based on their intuition and 
prior beliefs. This fear-based, threat-confirming reasoning style is thought to be a ‘better 
safe than sorry’ reasoning strategy, whereby the individual neglects the logical validity of 
the conclusion they draw. This may in turn lead to the formation of stable cognitions and 
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belief systems which may set an individual at risk of developing a psychological disorder. 
In conclusion, the tenent of this theory is that individuals with psychological difficulties are 
not illogical, but may neglect logical reasoning processes in favour of a threat-driven, faith 
in intuition.  
Belief bias is often tested experimentally using syllogistic reasoning tasks (Smeets 
& de Jong, 2005; Gangemi, Mancini & Johnson-Laird, 2013). When faced with these tasks, 
participants are asked to judge the logical validity of the syllogisms consisting of two 
statements, the premise, and a conclusion. In traditional paradigms, there are two types of 
syllogisms: conflict problems, in which the logical conclusion is inconsistent with one's 
beliefs (valid–implausible and invalid–plausible) and non-conflict problems in which the 
logical conclusion is consistent with one’s beliefs (valid–plausible and invalid–
implausible). Individuals are typically faster and more accurate when making a decision 
about the validity of a syllogism when there is a match than when there is a mismatch 
between the validity and believability of the conclusion (Vroling, Glashouwer, Lange, 
Allart-van Dam & de Jong, 2016).  
The dual-process model of reasoning offers a theoretical explanation for the belief 
bias phenomenon. According to this theory, the human mind utilises two separate 
reasoning processes when making decisions (Epstein, 1994). Intuitive processes (‘Type 
one’ reasoning) are thought to be more implicit, rapid and based on prior knowledge. In 
contrast, analytical processes (‘Type two’ reasoning) are thought to be slower, more 
effortful and rule-based. It is widely acknowledged that emotion can influence both types 
of reasoning (Blanchette & Richards, 2004). An important assumption of the model is that 
Type one processes provide default responses that can be altered if Type two processes 
intervene. Belief bias is therefore observed when there is a reliance on Type one reasoning, 
and less of an engagement with Type two thinking.   
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The Hyper-emotion theory (HET) of psychological illness 
In contrast, the HET (Johnson-Laird, Mancini & Gangemi, 2006) suggests that 
emotions of excessive intensity may actually improve logical reasoning over time. The 
theory states that in any given situation, individuals with mental health difficulties may 
experience an emotion at a high intensity. The individual does not know why this emotion 
is being experienced at such intensity, and as emotion directs reasoning, the individual 
begins to search for answers. A cause is then attributed, based on a number of factors such 
as the presence of reasoning biases and personal experiences. When this emotion is re-
experienced in another situation, the same pattern of reasoning occurs, and through 
processes such as rumination, an increasing number of possibilities related to this cause are 
envisioned. Over time, it is hypothesised that individuals with psychological difficulties 
become ‘expert’ reasoners about emotional topics related to their difficulties. The authors 
have also identified characteristic patterns of reasoning associated with certain disorders. 
For example, the researchers outline a type of extreme confirmation bias in individuals 
with hypochondria (Johnson-Laird et al., 2006).  
Gangemi and colleagues (2013) found evidence for the HET in two of their recent 
studies. The authors reported that anxious participants drew more valid conclusions that 
were anxiety-related on a syllogistic reasoning task (75%) than those that were not (38%), 
and that this difference was larger than the difference for the control participants, which 
was in-fact nonexistent (33% neutral conclusions vs. 33% anxiety-related conclusions). In 
the same study, the researchers also compared the impact of emotion and beliefs on logical 
reasoning in depressed participants and controls, and found similar results. Other studies, 
using the simulation heuristic to test the HET, have reported mixed findings. Rose et al (in 
press) found evidence of expert reasoning in individuals with social anxiety, however was 
unable to replicate this finding in those with paranoia. Additionally, Huddy, Brown, Boyd 
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and Wykes (2014) found that individuals with clinical paranoia actually produced less 
coherent simulations compared with matched controls, when the content was related to 
their concerns, a finding recently replicated by Huddy, Drake and Wykes (2016). In light of 
these findings, however, the simulation paradigm presumes that reasoning about 
hypothetical scenarios makes use of imagery and future-based thinking (Raune, MacLeod 
& Holmes, 2005). It may well be that present-time perceptions with less use of imagery, is 
more characteristic of paranoia.  
The current study 
The process of making and revising judgements is of obvious importance to 
understanding paranoid thinking. There is a wealth of literature exploring reasoning biases 
in paranoia; however, the role of logical reasoning has received less research attention. The 
dual-process model of reasoning has also been utilised to better understand thinking styles 
more generally in individuals with paranoia (Evans, 2003, Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
Previous research has found that higher levels of paranoid thoughts were associated with 
greater experiential reasoning and less analytic reasoning (Freeman, Evans & Lister, 2012). 
In light of this, however, research findings are mixed and further research is needed to 
ascertain how these cognitive styles contribute to paranoid thinking across the continuum. 
For example, Ward et al (2018) found that individuals with more severe psychotic 
experiences employed less analytical reasoning during their experimental task. In contrast, 
the nonclinical group did not differ from controls in rational reasoning abilities. 
In addition, the belief bias and the HET have been tested using participants with a 
range of psychological difficulties including anxiety, depression and phobias. The two 
theories are yet to be tested with those experiencing paranoid thoughts. 
The aim of the current study was to assess logical reasoning abilities in individuals 
high in non-clinical paranoia. In line with the continuum theory, an exploration of 
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reasoning ability in non-clinical paranoia is likely to inform the understanding and 
treatment of clinically severe delusional beliefs (Linscott & van Os, 2013). To test this 
hypothesis, the study compared the reasoning of highly-paranoid individuals (HP) with 
those high in social anxiety (SA; as a comparison group, but also as a second test of the 
belief bias theory and the HET) and a control group (L; participants scoring low on social 
anxiety and paranoia). It is widely acknowledged that both paranoia and social anxiety 
involve the expectation of negative responses from others (Tone, Goulding, & Compton, 
2011) and symptoms such as a failure to consider or generate alternative explanations for 
aversive social experiences, are viewed as key features of both persecutory ideation and 
social anxiety (Freeman & Garety, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995). It is hoped that as a result, 
any differences between the two groups on study measures can be more confidently 
attributed to paranoid cognitions.  
Hypotheses:  
Hypothesis one: The HET predicts that HP and SA participants will reason more 
logically (and therefore make fewer errors on the reasoning task) when the task content is 
related to their concerns, compared to when the content is non-specific. This difference is 
expected to be greater than the corresponding difference in the L group. 
Hypothesis two: Belief bias theory predicts that HP and SA individuals will display 
a greater belief bias when the syllogisms are related to the participants’ concerns, compared 
to when the content is non-specific. More specifically, HP and SA participants will reason 
less accurately with conflict syllogism conclusions (implausible-valid and plausible-
invalid) and more accurately with non-conflict syllogism conclusions (implausible-invalid 
and plausible-valid) when the content is related to their concerns, compared to when the 
content is non-specific. This difference is expected to be greater than the corresponding 
difference in the L group. 
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Hypothesis three: In line with previous research with highly paranoid individuals, 
it is predicted that paranoia severity will be positively associated with an intuitive thinking 
style and negatively associated with an analytical thinking style in the HP group.  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
The study was advertised to first year, undergraduate psychology students at Royal 
Holloway, who could participate to earn course credits (n = 101). Eighty-nine of the 
participants were female (88%), nine were male (9%), two participants identified with 
another gender not specified (2%) and one participant did not wish to disclose their gender 
(1%). The mean overall age of the sample was 18.94 years (SD= 2.76; range = 15-36). 
Further demographic information is reported in the results section (see Table 4). 
Participants were divided into three groups; a HP group, a SA group and an L group. Group 
membership was decided based on the participants’ scores on the Paranoia Scale (PS; 
Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992; see Appendix 4), a measure of sub-clinical paranoia, and the 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000; see Appendix 4), a widely-used 
measure of social anxiety.  
Thirty-four participants scored above cut-off on the PS ( ≥ 53) and formed the HP 
group. Normative data from the student sample used by Fenigstien and Vanable (1992) 
were used to identify the cut-off score for HP group membership, and a number of other 
studies have utilized the same approach (Combs, Michael, & Penn, 2006; Combs & Penn, 
2004). Importantly, individuals scoring at or above this cut-off score on the PS have been 
found to display similar social, cognitive, and behavioural biases to those observed in 
individuals with persecutory beliefs (Combs et al., 2007). The HP group was not required 
to be low in social anxiety, as research suggests social anxiety is intrinsic to paranoia 
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(Bebbington et al, 2013), and paranoid thoughts are thought to build upon common social 
anxieties such as a fear of rejection (Freeman et al., 2005). A number of researchers have 
reported that a score of 19 on the SPIN distinguishes between participants with and without 
social phobia (Connor et al., 2000). Thirty-seven participants scored >19 on the SPIN but 
<53 on the PS and formed the SA group. Thirty participants scored below both cut-off 
points and formed the L group. 
Power Analysis 
To estimate the sample size needed for the current study, existing research in the 
area was reviewed. Gangemi and colleagues’ (2012) study found that individuals with 
anxiety reasoned significantly more accurately than controls when the task content was 
relevant to their concerns (effect size: d= 0.85; Cohen, 1988). A larger effect size in the 
same direction was reported when researchers compared the reasoning of depressed 
participants and controls with depression-relevant content (d=2.38). Previous studies 
exploring logical reasoning in individuals with paranoia have reported more modest 
differences. One study reported that individuals with delusions showed enhanced logical 
reasoning with plausible (d=0.82) and implausible (0.54) syllogisms compared with 
controls (Owen, Cutting & David, 2007).  
Taking these effect sizes into account, an expected overall large effect size (d = 
0.80) was estimated for the current study. As the planned analyses involved multiple 
significance tests (both within and between-subjects), a power analysis was calculated 
based on the sample size needed to detect both of these effects (Greenwald, 1976). Power 
calculations based on an effect size of d = .80, power at .80 and alpha at .05, indicated a 
sample of seven participants per condition (21 in total) to detect effects using an ANOVA 
analyses. In order to test differences between any two groups on measures of interest, a 
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second power calculation was conducted. This analysis stated that we would need 21 
participants in each study group (63 in total) in order to detect the expected effect. 
Recruitment 
Students interested in taking part in the study were able to read through the 
information sheet online, which explained that the research aimed to investigate how 
thoughts about other people, and thinking styles more generally, can influence how people 
make decisions (see Appendix 3). Students could then sign up to available time-slots online 
to complete the study, which took around 30-minutes to complete. The only inclusion 
criteria for the study was having a level of English sufficient to read and understand the 
information sheet, provide consent, and complete the questionnaires.  
Measures 
Self report. 
The Paranoia Scale (PS; Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). The PS a 20-item 
questionnaire used to assess paranoid thinking. Responses are given on a five-point scale, 
ranging from one (not at all applicable to me) to five (extremely applicable to me) and 
example items include: ‘I sometimes feel as if I am being followed’ and ‘someone has it in 
for me’. Total scores range from 20-100, and higher scores indicate greater levels of 
paranoia. Fenigstein and Vanable (1992) validated the PS with 581 students, and found that 
the questionnaire had good internal reliability (a = .84). The PS also demonstrated good 
test-retest reliability when used with a student sample (a = .70; Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992). In the same study by Fenigstein and Vanable (1992), the scale achieved a 
Cronbach's alpha of .84, indicating good internal consistency. The authors also reported 
that the PS was negatively correlated with measures of interpersonal trust (r(150) = .30, p < 
.01) and positively correlated with the ‘control by powerful others’ scale (r(150) = .34, p < 
.01), indicating good construct validity.  
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The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000). The SPIN is a 17-item 
questionnaire, consisting of questions which evaluate fear (eg., people in authority), 
avoidance (eg., of being the centre of attention), and physiological discomfort (eg., 
blushing in front of other people). Each of the 17 items is rated on a five-point scale, 
ranging from zero (not at all) to four (extremely), based on the presence of symptoms over 
the past week. Total scores range from zero to 68, with higher scores indicating greater 
distress. The SPIN has been reported to be a reliable and valid measure of social anxiety in 
non-clinical, student populations. Radomsky and colleagues (2006) reported that the SPIN 
exhibited good convergent validity, excellent internal consistency (α = .93) and test-retest 
reliability (r = .86) in a sample of undergraduate students.  
Depression and Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). 
The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report measure of depression, anxiety, and stress. Each 
subscale is made up of seven items, and each item is rated on a three-point Likert scale 
(zero = never, three = almost always) based on how individuals have felt over the last 
week. Responses are added together, with scores on each subscale ranging from zero to 21 
(and total scores ranging from zero to 63), with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
stress, anxiety and depression. Tran, Tran and Fisher (2013) reported that the scale had 
high internal reliability (α = .70) and found significant correlations between DASS scores 
and other measures including the Beck Anxiety and Depression Scales (r, ranged from 0.58 
to 0.78).  
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-10; Norris, Pacini & Epstein, 1998). The 
REI-10 was designed to assess preferences for information processing, and measures two 
distinct cognitive styles. The inventory is comprised of two subscales, each consisting of 
five items. Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier (1996) reported that the correlation 
between the NFC and FI sub-scales (r(970) = .08, p < .01), though significant because of 
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the large sample size, indicated that the two scales were largely independent. The five-item 
NFC sub-scale has been found to be a reliable measure for assessing an individual’s desire 
to engage in rational thought (α=.73; Epstein, et al., 1996). A sample item is ‘I would 
prefer complex to simple problems’. Epstein and colleagues (1996) reported positive 
correlations with measures of action-oriented coping (r(184) = 0.41, p < .01) and negative 
correlations with naive optimism (r(184)=-0.37, p=<0.01), indicating good construct 
validity. The five-item, FI sub-scale has been found to be a reliable measure of the 
tendency to engage in and have confidence in one’s intuition (α= 0.72; Epstein et al., 
1996). A sample item is, ‘my initial impressions of people are almost always right’. 
Epstein and colleagues (1996) reported positive correlations with naïve optimism (r(184) = 
0.20, p < .05)  and esoteric thinking (r(184)=-0.30, p=<0.01), indicating good construct 
validity. 
Experimental tasks. 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-4; Frederick, 2005). The Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT-4) is a four-item inventory designed to measure analytical and/or intuitive 
thinking. The test consists of four simple mathematical problems that elicit intuitively 
appealing, but incorrect responses. Engagement with analytical reasoning processes mean 
that the intuitive response is rejected and further processing ensues, in order to figure out 
the correct answer. A faith in intuition means that the intuitively appealing response is 
reported as being correct. Correct responses are totalled to create a CRT score (minimum= 
zero, maximum = four). The scale has been found to have acceptable internal consistency 
(α = 0.72; Ross et al., 2015). Performance on the CRT-4 has been found to be positively 
associated with performance on a measure on actively open-minded thinking (r = 025, 
p=<0.05), and a measure of logical thinking (r=0.43, p=<0.01; Campitelli & Gerrans, 
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2014), both of which are proposed to be measured by the test (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 
2011). This positive correlation indicates good construct validity.  
Probabilistic Reasoning Task (“Beads Task”; Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). 
The beads task is used to assess the jumping to conclusions (JTC) reasoning style. 
Participants are shown an image on-screen of two jars of beads, along with task instructions 
based on those used by Garety and colleagues (2005; See Appendix 5). One jar is labelled 
as the ‘mainly red jar’ (and is described and depicted as having 60 red beads and 40 blue 
beads), and the other jar is labelled as being the ‘mainly blue jar’ (and is described and 
depicted as having 40 red beads and 60 blue beads). After the images of the jars are 
removed from sight, participants are shown a sequence of beads being drawn from one of 
the jars with replacement. The order in which the beads are drawn is pre-specified and 
identical for all participants. After each draw, participants are asked if they would like to 
decide which jar the beads are being drawn from or if they would like to see another bead. 
Data gathering was operationalized as the number of beads the participant asked to see 
before making a decision. 
Syllogistic reasoning task. A syllogistic reasoning task was used in the current 
study to assess logical reasoning abilities. Thirty syllogisms were presented to study 
participants in argument form, consisting of two premises, followed by a conclusion (see 
Appendix 5). Each syllogism was considered valid if accepting the two premises as true, 
leads one to also accept the conclusion as true. The syllogisms were presented on screen as 
a single, sequential list, and participants were instructed to respond to each item by 
marking each conclusion shown as either valid or invalid. The syllogisms were presented in 
a fixed, random order to all participants. The majority of the syllogisms used in the study 
were obtained from researchers who had conducted a similar study (Gangemi et al., 2013). 
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The social anxiety-related syllogisms were devised by the researcher for the purpose of the 
study.  
Content. Ten of the syllogisms used were paranoia-related, 10 were non-specific, 
but highly emotive, and the remaining 10 were social anxiety-related. The non-specific 
syllogisms included were similar to those used by Blanchette and colleagues (2007), who 
also investigated the impact of emotion and beliefs on reasoning processes. The paranoia 
related items were devised following a review of the syllogisms used in Kemp, Chua, 
McKenna and David’s (1997) study exploring syllogistic reasoning ability in individuals 
with delusions. In an attempt to ensure that the social anxiety-related syllogisms were 
sufficiently relevant to commonly reported concerns, syllogisms were devised following a 
review of the items making up the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN) and the Social Phobia 
Beliefs Questionnaire (SPBQ; as used by Vroling & de Jong, 2009. For example: 
vulnerability in social situations, feelings of being watched in social situations and 
appraisals around social skills). The syllogisms were presented from several perspectives: a 
public self-referent (eg., some people who are self-conscious are tongue-tied) and a private 
self-referent (eg., every time I walk into a room full of people I feel nervous). This was 
done as it is unclear in the literature as to whether social anxiety concerns negative public 
or private self-referent convictions, or both (Mansell & Clark, 1999; Hoffman & 
Scepkowski, 2006).  
Plausibility. In order to test the belief bias hypotheses, the syllogism conclusions 
varied according to their plausibility. With the non-specific items, the plausibility of the 
syllogisms varied according to societal norms, commonly-held and less commonly-held 
universal beliefs. With the paranoia and social-anxiety related syllogisms, the plausibility 
was varied according to the extent to which the conclusions were congruent with the beliefs 
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typical of each disorder. With non-conflict trials, the logical response was thought to be 
consistent with these beliefs. In conflict trials, the logical response was thought to be 
inconsistent with these beliefs (see Table 3 for an illustration of each combination).  
Calculation of belief bias scores 
In line with previous research, a belief bias effect is observed when participants find 
it relatively easy to judge valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable syllogisms (i.e., when 
there is a match between validity and believability) and relatively difficult to judge the 
logical validity of valid-unbelievable and invalid-believable syllogisms. As per previous 
research exploring belief bias in those with social anxiety (Vroling & de Jong, 2010) we 
computed belief bias summary scores (BB scores) for each content domain. Each BB score 
was computed by subtracting the number of correct answers from the matched syllogisms 
from the number of correct scores from the mismatched syllogisms. Therefore: BB = conflict 
items ((valid-unbelievable + invalid-believable) - congruent items ((valid-believable) + 
(invalid + unbelievable)). A higher score indicated a larger degree of belief bias. A global 
belief bias score was then computed by adding together the total BB scores from each 
domain. 
 
Table 3. Examples of paranoia syllogisms, varying in logical validity and plausibility 
 Plausibility 
 Plausible Implausible 
Logical status   
Valid 
(A)  Every time I walk down the street, I 
think I’m being followed. 
(B)  Sometimes, when I walk down  
(A)  Some of my 
persecutors are not friends 
of mine. 
(B)  Everyone who is mad 
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the street, I feel I’m in danger. 
Does it logically follow that… 
(C) …sometimes, when I think I’m being 
followed, I feel in danger.  
at me are friends of 
mine. 
Does it logically follow 
that… 
 (C) … some of my 
persecutors are not mad 
at me 
Invalid 
(A)  Sometimes, when I’m alone, I start 
thinking. 
(B)  Sometimes, when I start thinking,  
I feel people are robbing me of my 
thoughts. 
Does it logically follow that… 
(C) …sometimes, when I’m alone, I feel 
people are robbing me of my 
thoughts.  
(A)  Some smart people are 
not evil. 
(B)  All of my persecutors 
are smart people 
Does it logically follow 
that… 
(C) … some of my 
persecutors are not evil   
 
 Reliability. As the syllogism task was devised for the purpose of this study, it was 
important to assess the reliability of the scale. Prior to recruitment, a pilot study was 
conducted to assess inter-rater reliability. Ten participants, all psychology doctoral 
students, were asked to categorise each syllogism as being “paranoia-related”, “social-
anxiety related” or “non-specific, but highly emotive”. A Fleiss’s Kappa was then 
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calculated to assess the extent of inter-rater agreement. The Kappa statistic obtained was 
κ=0.60, which is indicative of an ‘intermediate-to-good’ extent of agreement (Fleiss, 1981).  
Prior to conducting the main analyses, it was noticed by the researcher that there 
were errors in the conclusions of two of the syllogisms devised (items 19 and 28; see 
Appendix 5). One of these items was non-specific and the other social anxiety-related. In 
light of this, these items were removed from the dataset, and responses to one paranoia-
related syllogism were also removed to ensure an equal number of items across content. In 
order to determine which paranoia-related item to remove, a reliability analysis was 
conducted to assess which item contributed the least to the overall reliability of the scale. 
Item 6 was identified and removed from the dataset.  
A reliability analyses was then conducted on the content scales making up the 27-
item syllogism set. The reliability of the social anxiety scale was α=0.20, for the paranoia-
scale was α=0.56 and for the non-specific scale was α=0.60. It is widely acknowledged that 
an alpha of 0.8 is acceptable, and that scores substantially lower than this indicate an 
unreliable scale (Field, 2005). In light of this, however, Kline (1999) highlighted that whilst 
a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.8 is acceptable for cognitive tests such as measures of intelligence, 
for ability tests a cut-off point of 0.7 is more suitable. As the reliability of the content scales 
was low, it was deemed appropriate to remove items from each scale where these detracted 
from alpha. This resulted in three syllogisms being removed from the social anxiety scale 
(items seven, 20, and 25). Finally, each of the content sub-scales (valid implausible, valid 
plausible, invalid-implausible, invalid-plausible) were then pro-rated to make up for the 
deleted items, so that the scores were comparable to those predicted to be found if all items 
were included. The reliability of the final content scales were: non-specific α = 0.60, 
paranoia α = 0.56, and social anxiety α = 0.44.  
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Procedure  
All questionnaires were completed online using Qualtrics online survey software 
and used request-choice questionnaire responses to minimise missing data. The order of 
presentation of tasks was the same for all participants and was as follows: 
1. Information sheet   
2. Informed consent form  
3. Socio-demographic questionnaire  
4. Syllogistic reasoning questionnaire  
5. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-4)  
6. The beads task 
7. DASS-21 
8. Paranoia Scale (PS) 
9. Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN)  
10. Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-10) 
11. Debrief form  
Ethical considerations 
The study was reviewed and received approval from the Royal Holloway Research 
Ethics Committee (REC ID: 482 see Appendix 1). The procedures were not anticipated to 
have any negative implications for participants. However, completing questionnaires that 
ask participants to reflect on paranoia or negative mood may have negative emotional 
effects. As such, the debrief page included information about relevant sources of emotional 
support, and participants were encouraged to contact the researcher by email should they 
have any questions or concerns about any aspect of their participation in the study. 
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RESULTS 
Overview 
This section opens with a description of the preliminary statistical procedures 
employed before hypothesis testing, including those used to screen for and handle missing 
data, an investigation into the distributions of the data, and managing outliers. Where data 
were not normally distributed, transformations were conducted so that the data met the 
assumptions for parametric tests. In addition, descriptive and statistical analyses were 
carried out to assess whether groups were equivalent at baseline on a number of 
demographic and other variables. Each hypothesis is then outlined, with details of the 
statistical procedures used and the results found. All data were processed using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS, version 21). Values are reported to two 
decimal places, apart from percentages which are reported to one decimal place. 
Conventional levels of statistical significance were used, with the alpha level p < 0.05 
adopted throughout, unless otherwise stated.  
Preliminary Statistical procedure 
Data inclusion. One hundred and seven participants completed the consent 
questions at the start of the study. Of these 107, 105 participants completed the study, with 
two participants withdrawing their consent before completion. The data set was then 
screened for missing values. Examination of the data revealed that four participants had 
consented to the study but did not complete any of the study measures, and so these were 
removed from the data set. Fourteen data points were missing from the syllogism 
questionnaire data. In these cases, missing scores were pro-rated by taking an average of 
the individual participants’ performance on syllogisms measuring the same construct 
measured by the missing data (eg. invalid, implausible SA-related items). A small amount 
of missing data was found on a number of other questionnaires (three data points) as 
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responses were not forced. Given the overall low frequency of missing values on these 
questionnaires, no specific statistical method was chosen to replace this missing data.  
Outliers. Outliers are data points that lie well outside the area of variance expected 
amongst sample scores (High, 2000). Outliers may represent an error in responding, or data 
recording, but may also represent a genuine extreme value, which occurs because an 
individual differs from the rest of the sample in a meaningful way (Field, 2013). It is 
therefore important to identify and examine individual outliers and evaluate the best course 
of action for managing them in the data set (Field, 2013). Initially, boxplots were inspected 
to identify univariate outliers, and data points that fell outside of the upper or lower 
quartiles were examined. For this thesis, data points were investigated as potential outliers 
if they fell more than three standard deviations above or below the sample mean (Field, 
2013). A total of three participants were identified as having extreme high scores on one of 
the study variables. High scores did not appear to be a systematic effect of group (HP: n = 
1; SA: n = 1; L: n = 1). High extreme scores were observed in the data obtained from the 
beads task. Further inspection indicated that these scores were likely to reflect true data 
points and therefore represent valid and meaningful variation within the sample. In 
addition, excluding meaningful data can lead to a loss of power and therefore increase the 
likelihood of Type one error (Bakker & Wichert, 2014). It was therefore decided to retain 
these extreme high scores within the dataset. 
Distribution of Variance. Normality and homogeneity of variance are both key 
assumptions for the use of parametric tests. Normality of distribution was initially assessed 
by visually examining histograms with normal curves for all study variables within each 
group. After visually examining histograms, each variable was formally assessed for skew 
and kurtosis using z-scores calculated by the researcher (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Normality was accepted if z < 3.29 (p > .001), such that a significant score on skew or 
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kurtosis was taken to indicate significantly non-normal distributions.  Histograms with 
normal curves and skew and kurtosis calculations indicated that the JTC data was 
positively skewed in the HP group, and the control group. A log-10 transformation 
successfully normalised this variable in both groups. For comparison purposes, variables 
that were transformed at any time point or within any condition had the same 
transformation applied to data at all time points and across all conditions.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Socio-demographic variables. The sociodemographic characteristics of the 
sample are presented in Table 4. The sample was made up of predominantly white, female, 
university students without a formal mental health diagnosis. Prior to the main hypotheses 
testing, a series of chi-square and one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests were 
computed to assess whether conditions were equivalent across sociodemographic variables. 
As illustrated in Table 4, there were no significant differences in these variables across 
study groups.  
Study variables at baseline. Scores on symptom measures are presented in Table 
5. Differences in scores on the SPIN and the PS reflect differences in group assignment. 
There were significant differences between study groups on measures of anxiety, stress and 
depression. Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) tests found that the SA and HP 
groups did not differ on measures of stress (t(69)= 0.08, p= 0.94), however, both were 
significantly more stressed than the control group (t(65)=4.63, p= < 0.01; t(62)=4.42, 
p=<0.01). The SA and HP groups did not differ on measures of anxiety (t(69)=-0.57, 
p=<0.01), however both were significantly more anxious than the control participants 
(t(58.14)=5.93, p=<0.01; t(48)=5.69, p=<0.01). Finally, the HP and SA participants did not 
differ on measures of depression (t(69)=-0.98, p=0.33) though both were significantly more 
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depressed than the L group (t(62) = 5.27, p<0.01; t(65) = 4.11, p=<0.01). There were no 
significant differences in the JTC bias between groups (F(2, 98) = 0.01, p = 0.99). 
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Sociodemographic 
variables 
 Condition  Test Statistic 
  Paranoia group  
n=34 
Social anxiety group  
n=37 
Control group  
n=30 
Total Sample 
n=101 
 
Gender Female 30  33  26  89 χ2 = 7.78, p = 0.26 
Male 4  1  4  9 
Other 0  2  0  2  
Prefer not to say 0  1  0  1  
Ethnicity White 19 29  22  70 χ2 = 19.16, p = 0.09 
Mixed race 1  0 4  5 
Asian 11 6 3  20 
Black 1  0  1  2  
Other 2  2  0  4  
Mental health 
treatment 
Yes 4 4 0 8  χ2 = 3.69, p =0.16 
No 30 33 30 93  
Age M (SD) 18.5 (0.99) 19.2 (3.11) 19.1 (3.58) 18.94 (2.76) F(2,98)=0.76,p=0.47 
Table 4. Socio-demographic variables 
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Note. SPIN = Social Phobia Inventory. PS = Paranoia Scale;. JTC = jumping to conclusions. Means reported 
are for untransformed scores; between-group comparisons based on transformed data where required to meet 
parametric assumptions. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis one: The HET. In line with the HET, the first hypothesis predicted that 
HP and SA participants would reason more accurately when syllogisms were relevant to 
their concerns compared to when the content was non-specific. This difference was 
 Paranoia 
n=34 
Social Anxiety 
n=37 
Control group 
n=30 
Test Statistic 
Measure M SD M SD M SD  
SPIN 36.29 14.55 31.16 8.75 11.73 5.6 F(2, 98) = 48.62,  
p = <0.01 
Depression 8.18 3.93 7.24 4.06 3.73 2.59 F(2,100)= 13.07, p= 
<0.01 
Anxiety 7.82 4.86 7.22 4.09 2.53 2.27 F(2,100)= 16.91,  
p= <0.01 
Stress 10.18 4.90 10.27 4.81 5.43 3.44 F(2,100)= 12.06,  
p= <0.01 
PS 61.47 8.20 39.05 8.34 32.90 8.75 F(2, 98) = 105.25,  
p = <0.01 
JTC 10.24 8.86 10.11 6.85 10.37 6.18 F(2, 98) = 0.01,  
p = 0.99 
Table 5. Symptom measures by group 
graphic variables 
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expected to be greater than the corresponding difference in the L group. In order to test this 
hypothesis, a 3 X 3 repeated measures ANOVA was computed. Syllogism content (three 
levels: paranoia-related, social anxiety related, non-specific) was the within-subjects factor. 
Participant group (three levels: HP, SA, L) was the between-subjects factor. The analyses 
found a significant main effect of content (F(2, 194)=21.37, p=<0.01) indicating there were 
differences in reasoning according to task content across participants. Further exploration 
of the data found that participants across all groups solved non-specific syllogisms with 
greatest accuracy, then those which were paranoia-related, followed lastly by those which 
were social-anxiety related. In contrast to study predictions, the content by group 
interaction was not significant (F(4,194)=0.78, p=0.54), indicating reasoning accuracy did 
not significantly differ across groups according to syllogism content (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Correct responses made by socially anxious, paranoid and control participants to 
syllogism items, by a) content of syllogism b) plausibility of syllogism conclusion  
 Group 
Syllogism content 
Paranoia 
M (SD) 
Social Anxiety 
M (SD) 
Control 
M (SD) 
Paranoia Total = 7.96 (0.41) Total = 7.81 
(0.41) 
Total = 7.95 (0.45) 
Non-conflict 4.32 (1.53) 4.18 (1.77) 4.35 (1.49) 
conflict 3.64 (1.45) 3.63 (1.43) 3.6 (1.37) 
Social Anxiety Total = 6.25 (0.47) Total = 6.98 
(0.45) 
Total = 6.56 (0.50) 
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Non-conflict 3.58 (0.24) 3.95 (0.22) 3.63 (0.25) 
Conflict 2.67 (0.34) 3.03 (0.32) 2.93 (0.36) 
Non-specific Total = 7.82 (0.47) Total = 8.43 
(0.45) 
Total = 7.86 (0.50) 
Non-conflict 4.61 (0.27) 4.70 (0.26) 4.53 (0.29) 
Conflict 3.21 (0.31) 3.73 (0.29) 3.33 (0.33) 
 
Hypothesis two: Belief bias theory. In line with the belief bias theory, it was 
predicted that HP and SA individuals would display a greater belief bias (higher BB scores) 
when the syllogisms are related to their concerns, compared to when the content is non-
specific. This difference was predicted to be greater than the corresponding differences in 
the L group. A 3 (group) X 3 (content) X 2 (congruency) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to test this hypothesis. The analyses found a significant main effect of conflict 
(F(1,97)= 58.67, p=<0.01). Further exploration of the data found that all participants solved 
congruent syllogisms more accurately than conflict syllogisms, irrespective of content. This 
finding supported the more general belief bias theory of reasoning. It was then observed 
that the interaction between congruency and content within each group was not significant 
(F(2,97)=2.13, p=0.12). This indicated that there were no significant differences in belief 
bias scores within each group according to syllogism content. Finally, there was no 
significant interaction between content and congruency, according to group membership 
(F(4,194)=0.23, p=0.92). This finding indicates that there were no significant differences 
between groups on belief bias scores according to syllogism content.  
Exploratory analyses looked at whether HP and SA individuals were more 
susceptible to belief bias compared with L participants, irrespective of syllogism content, in 
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line with some previous research. A one-way ANOVA found that there were no significant 
difference in belief bias scores overall between groups (F(2,97)=0.22, p=0.81), indicating 
that HP and SA individuals were not any more or less susceptible to belief bias across 
content, compared with L participants.  
Hypothesis three: Relationship between thinking styles and paranoia. In line with 
previous research, it was predicted that paranoia severity would be positively associated 
with an intuitive thinking style and negatively associated with analytical thinking style in 
the HP group. This would be reflected in less accurate reasoning on “conflict” syllogisms 
(i.e. where there is a conflict between the validity and plausibility of the conclusion), fewer 
beads viewed on the beads task (indicating the presence of the JTC bias), a higher score on 
the FI sub-scale and a lower score on the NFC sub-scale of the REI and a lower total score 
on the CRT.  A correlation analysis was conducted using all study variables in the HP 
group (see Appendix 6 for correlation matrix). The analysis found no significant 
relationship between paranoia severity and performance on conflict syllogisms (r(34) = -
0.06, p=0.75), score on the CRT (r(34)= -0.17, p=0.34) or performance on the beads task 
(r(34)=0.05, p=0.80). Interestingly, a significant positive relationship was reported between 
paranoia severity and an analytical thinking style, as measured by the REI (r(34)=0.37, 
p=0.03) There was a also trend towards a significant positive relationship between paranoia 
severity and a faith in intuition in this group (r(34)= 0.29, p=0.1).  
 
DISCUSSION 
The current study aimed to further the understanding of reasoning processes 
associated with paranoid thinking. Specifically, the research explored logical reasoning and 
thinking styles in individuals with non-clinical paranoia, as a test of the HET, the dual-
process model and the belief bias theory. HP individuals were compared with participants 
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scoring high in social anxiety and those scoring low on both measures. In line with the 
HET, it was predicted that HP and SA participants would reason more accurately on the 
logical reasoning task when the content was related to their concerns. In contrast, belief 
bias theory predicted that HP and SA participants would display an enhanced belief bias 
when reasoning about content related to their concerns, compared to when the content was 
non-specific. Neither hypothesis was supported by the study findings. Finally, it was 
predicted that paranoia severity would be positively associated with an intuitive thinking 
style, and negatively associated with an analytical thinking style in the HP group. 
Interestingly, the current study found some evidence that paranoia severity was in fact 
positively associated with both analytical and intuitive reasoning. In light of this, however, 
there was no significant association between paranoia severity and other measures of 
analytical and intuitive reasoning (CRT, conflict syllogisms and the beads task). This 
section will open with a discussion of the study findings in relation to theory and previous 
research. The strengths and limitations of the study will then be discussed, before 
considering future research and possible clinical implications. The findings of the thesis 
will then be drawn together with conclusions. 
Hypothesis one: The HET.  
A small number of studies have explored reasoning abilities in individuals with 
clinical (Huddy, Brown, Boyd & Wykes, 2012) and non-clinical paranoia (Rose et al., in 
press) as a test of the HET. Both studies used simulation methodologies to assess future-
directed reasoning in individuals experiencing paranoid thoughts. The research found that 
enhanced reasoning was not observed in individuals with paranoia when the task content 
was relevant to their concerns. It was speculated that perhaps paranoia was not significantly 
associated with the use of imagery-based, future-directed thinking as captured by this 
methodology. A syllogistic reasoning task was therefore used in the current study to assess 
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logical reasoning ability, as has been used by other researchers testing the HET and belief 
bias theories. In light of this, however, the present study added to a growing evidence base 
suggesting that a preoccupation with paranoid thoughts may not be associated with 
enhanced reasoning about feared material. Along the same lines, a number of studies have 
tested the HET using socially anxious individuals. Some research has found evidence of 
expert reasoning when the task content is disorder-relevant in this group (Rose et al., in 
press), however other studies have failed to replicate these findings (Vroling et al., 2009). It 
is not immediately clear why the pattern of reasoning described by the HET was not 
replicated in the current study. Several hypotheses could be put forward to explain these 
findings.  
Firstly, the HET suggests that underlying patterns of repetitive thinking gradually 
leads the individual to envisage a wider range of possibilities linked to their feared outcome 
(Johnson-Laird et al., 2006). Such cyclical patterns of thinking as described by the HET, 
may not be as typical of paranoia compared with anxiety disorders such as OCD. Research 
has shown that more cursory thinking tends to be observed in paranoia (Dudley & Over, 
2003; Jacobsen, Freeman & Salkovskis, 2012). In addition, the anticipatory nature of the 
anxiety characteristic of disorders such as phobias may promote this rehearsal of disorder-
relevant content as described by the HET. In contrast, research suggests, however, that self-
referential ideation, typical of both social anxiety and paranoia, is influenced more by acute 
fear, the environment, and present time perceptions (e.g., a facial expression; Freeman et 
al., 2008) that are less anticipatory. Further, there is evidence in the literature that paranoia 
and social anxiety are partly maintained by a type of post-event, as opposed to pre-event, 
ruminative processing, which involves the mental replaying of social events after their 
conclusion (Piccirillo & Heimberg, 2016). Such factors mean that paranoia, and perhaps 
social anxiety, may be less well explained by the HET. 
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In addition, a number of methodological limitations of the study should also be 
addressed. First, whilst efforts were made to ensure that the syllogisms contained common 
paranoia and social-anxiety related concerns, the pilot data indicated only moderate inter-
rater reliability. It may be that the content was not matched sufficiently to individual beliefs 
to elicit the corresponding reasoning style predicted by the HET. For example, Keen, 
Brown and Wheatley (2008) reported that when the task content was not personally 
relevant to an individual’s OCD-related concerns, reasoning was less accurate compared to 
when the task content was personalized. In addition, the internal reliability of the content 
scales devised for the study was fairly low, indicating that the items may not have 
adequately measured the variable of interest (Kline, 2000). In light of this, however, it 
could be argued that the syllogistic reasoning task is an experimental task as opposed to a 
psychometric measure, in which case the reliability co-efficient may be of less importance 
here. Future research should address these points.   
A number of other extraneous factors could have influenced these findings. Firstly, 
efforts were made to avoid potential threats to validity in the current study, including 
participant fatigue. For example, fewer items were included in the logical reasoning task 
compared with previous research (Gangemi et al., 2013) and the reasoning task was placed 
at the start of the study. However, it is possible that the cognitive effort required to solve 
the syllogisms correctly may have caused participants to become tired, dampened their 
interest and reduced emotional arousal. In light of these factors, participants may have been 
less motivated to complete the task to the best of their abilities. We may have therefore 
been unable capture the same cognitive processes that would be activated if the participants 
were motivated and aroused. Another possibility is that the study lacked sufficient power to 
detect statistical differences between groups. Previous research exploring the HET has 
explored the logical reasoning abilities of clinical participants (Gangemi et al., 2013). In 
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light of this, it may well be that, in line with continuum theories, enhanced logical 
reasoning is apparent in non-clinical paranoia and less severe social anxiety, albeit to a 
lesser extent than in individuals with more severe and pervasive beliefs. Although the 
current study recruited more participants than was indicated by the power analysis, it may 
be that the current sample was still not large enough to detect more subtle differences in 
reasoning between groups. Future research should address these study limitations. 
Hypothesis two: The belief bias theory  
Firstly, the study found that all participants tended to accept congruent conclusions 
as valid more often than incongruent conclusions, in line with the global belief bias theory 
(Evans et al., 1993). Next, the current study found that HP and SA individuals did not 
display an enhanced belief bias when content was related to their concerns in some way. 
This finding was in contrast with previous research in the area (Vroling & de Jong, 2009; 
Vroling et al., 2016). A number of factors should be considered when reflecting on this 
finding. First, as discussed above, the syllogisms may not have captured HP and SA 
relevant-concerns sufficiently enough to elicit the reasoning style predicted. Again, it may 
well be that the study lacked sufficient power to detect any findings. Sample size was 
calculated based on the assumption of large effects (Johnson-Laird et al., 2006), whereas 
previous studies exploring belief bias in individuals with psychological difficulties have 
reported small-to-moderate effect sizes (Vroling et al., 2016). It may have been that a 
significant difference in symptom-specific belief bias would have been evident had we used 
a larger sample. In addition, some studies exploring belief bias have measured the bias in 
terms of the time taken to arrive at a conclusion on each item (RT’s). It could be argued that 
reaction time is a more accurate indicator of belief bias, as a measure of the Type one and 
Type two reasoning processes. However, belief bias is likely to translate into reasoning 
errors in day-to-day life, as life events typically demand quick-responses as opposed to 
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having a lot of time to reflect on the logical validity of a conclusion drawn. It could thus be 
argued that measuring belief bias in terms of reasoning errors made is likely to capture 
more ‘realistic’ reasoning processes. 
Interestingly, some research has hypothesised that individuals with psychological 
difficulties display an enhanced reasoning bias more globally, across all of their beliefs. (De 
Jong et al., 1997; Vroling & de Jong, 2010). The current study did not find evidence of an 
enhanced belief bias across task content in HP and SA compared with L participants. On 
review of the literature, it was found that no relationship between a generally enhanced 
belief bias and psychopathology has been found in observational studies using healthy, 
analogue and patient samples (Smeets & de Jong, 2005; Vroling & de Jong, 2009). In light 
of this, however, when using a fear conditioning paradigm as a means of modelling the 
development of an anxiety disorder, a generally enhanced belief bias was especially marked 
when participants were in a state of fear (Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson, & Ohman, 2005; 
Mansell, Clark, Ehlers, & Chen, 1999). In line with this, it could be that symptom-related 
belief bias may be more evident during the activation of fear, which perhaps was not 
elicited using the syllogistic reasoning task. One way to test this assumption would be to 
induce a state of anxiety/paranoia prior to the presentation of the task (Kirschbaum, Pirke & 
Hellhammer, 1993). Bringing these results together, it may well be that a generally 
heightened belief bias itself does not contribute to the development of anxiety disorders, but 
that heightened belief bias combined with anxiety-inducing learning experiences may well 
do. If so, it is likely only one of the many factors that contribute to the development and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders.  
Hypothesis three: Relationship between thinking styles and paranoia. 
The hypothesis for the current study was made in line with previous research 
(Freeman, Evans and Lister, 2012), which found that self-reported use of intuitive 
 98 
reasoning was associated with higher levels of persecutory thinking, whilst analytical 
thinking was protective. Consistent with these findings, Daalman, Sommer, Derks and 
Peters (2013) found that healthy voice-hearers showed high levels of ‘emotional reasoning’ 
(a bias showing clear overlap with intuitive reasoning). A number of clinical interventions 
have been developed based on these findings. One example of this is the ‘SlowMo’ app 
(Garety et al., 2017), a protocol-driven individual therapy delivered via mobile phone. The 
intervention aims to reduce paranoia by supporting individuals to notice their upsetting 
concerns and fast-thinking habits, and then provides them with strategies to slow down, 
focus on new information, develop safer thoughts and engage more with Type two thinking.  
As the findings were in contrast with the literature, it could be hypothesised that the 
current study findings may be due to a number of factors. First, acquiescence effects, 
defined as ‘the general tendency of an individual to provide affirmative answers to items of 
a questionnaire, regardless of the content of the items’ (Hinz, Michalski, Schwarz & 
Herzberg, 2007) could have meant that participants seemingly displayed a preference for 
intuitive and rational thinking on the REI-10. However, correlations between the NFC and 
FI subscales and other variables (e.g. BB, PS syllogism total) contradict this assumption. 
Further, another study reported that a preference for both intuitive Type one and Type two 
thinking styles was associated with stronger paranormal beliefs (Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, 
Bischoff & Mischo, 1999).  Instead, this finding could be explained by a complementary 
relationship between these different forms of information processing systems, as outlined 
by parallel processing, dual-model theories of reasoning. The predominance of both 
intuitive and analytical reasoning could also explain why no relationship was found 
between paranoia severity and other study measures (CRT-4, Beads task & conflict 
syllogisms), which tap into both reasoning styles simultaneously, as opposed to measuring 
each reasoning style as separate constructs. 
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Speechley, Murray, McKay, Munz and Ngan (2010) proposed a Dual-Stream 
Modulation Failure model hypothesis that could help explain the current study findings. 
The researchers explained that typically, most situations result in the convergence of Type 
one and Type two reasoning processes, though it is not uncommon for divergence to occur. 
The occurrence of diverging outcomes often leads to an internal conflict or sense of 
dissonance. It is proposed that this conflict has a modulating influence in favour of Type 
two processing, thus reducing the likelihood of erroneous, intuitive judgments. In 
delusional ideation, convincing counter-evidence fails to persuade an individual of the 
inaccuracy of their beliefs. This fundamental error in decision-making may result from a 
failure to notice or respond to internal conflict generated by the divergence of the two 
streams. This may cause individuals to apply both reasoning styles in a dysfunctional way, 
which means that erroneous beliefs are not corrected. Functional imaging data supports this 
hypothesis, with schizophrenia patients showing reduced activation in conflict detection 
regions of the brain in response to incongruent stimuli during a Stroop task (Carter, Mintun, 
Nichols & Cohen, 1997). 
Other studies using clinical participants with persecutory delusions have reported 
somewhat different findings to those discussed above. One study found that a combination 
of low analytic and low experiential reasoning was associated with the greatest levels of 
paranoia (Freeman, Lister & Evans, 2014). The reduced engagement with intuitive 
reasoning processes was an unexpected finding. It was hypothesised by the authors that this 
may reflect patients with severe paranoia being less aware of their decision-making 
processes, or being unconfident in their reasoning abilities and hence less able to re-
evaluate fearful cognitions. An interesting study by Ward, Peters, Jackson and Garety 
(2017) explored the dual process model of reasoning across the psychosis continuum. The 
researchers found that individuals with psychosis associated with a need-for-care, employed 
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less analytical reasoning on a reasoning task compared with the other groups. In contrast, 
those with psychosis but without need-for-care, did not differ from controls in analytical 
reasoning abilities. Interestingly, in line with the current study findings, the non-clinical 
group also demonstrated high levels of experiential reasoning, with over 60% showing clear 
evidence of both reasoning processes. These findings suggest that the relative use and 
application of each thinking style is likely to vary across the psychosis continuum. 
Although not an a priori hypothesis, it was noted that individuals with paranoia 
displayed moderate levels of depression, anxiety and stress. This was in contrast with L 
participants, who scored in the normal ranges on all three measures. It is widely 
acknowledged that psychosocial stress is associated with, and can precipitate psychotic 
symptoms (Corcoran, Mujica-Parodi, Yale, Leitman & Malaspina, 2002). Further, the 
association between anxiety and paranoia is widely acknowledged, and a number of 
interventions have been developed to treat these symptoms, with promising results 
(Freeman & Fowler, 2009). Depression has been found to be a risk factor in the 
development and maintenance of paranoia (Salokangas et al., 2015) as well as a being a 
response to experiencing paranoid thoughts. In light of this, however, the mechanisms by 
which symptoms of depression influences paranoid thinking is less clear. It is hypothesised 
that depressive ideas about oneself, such as negative self-schemas, directly feed into the 
content of the paranoid beliefs, and low mood is a key maintenance factor (Vorontsova et 
al., 2013). Others have highlighted that an interaction between low self-esteem, anxiety and 
depression puts individuals at risk of developing paranoia (Ben-Zeev, Granholm & Cafri, 
2009). Longitudinal studies are needed to assess the relative contribution of depressive 
symptoms to paranoid thinking in this group. If depression is found to be a risk factor, the 
effective treatment of the symptoms is likely to alleviate paranoid symptoms and improve 
interpersonal functioning. 
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Strengths and Limitations 
Design. A number of study design limitations must be discussed. Firstly, as the 
study was cross-sectional, the associations described could be explained by an unmeasured 
confounding variable, while the direction of the relationship between thinking styles and 
paranoia cannot be known. Further, we did not conduct a manipulation check of the 
believability of the syllogisms used, as was done by other researchers (Gangemi et al., 
2013). In light of this, some conclusions described may have been more or less believable 
than others. This may have influenced the findings of the belief bias test.  
In addition to this, a decision was made to explore reasoning and thinking styles in 
paranoid individuals scoring above the cut off of 52 on the PS. Whilst this method captured 
the association between reasoning and paranoia at the more severe end, it could be argued 
that the variability in the ways by which these factors interact with paranoia across the 
continuum is not adequately captured by grouping participants in this way. Future research 
should explore thinking styles and paranoia across the continuum, to shed light on the 
different ways they are implicated in paranoid thinking. Future studies could use regression 
analyses to explore whether experiential and/or rational thinking predicts paranoia severity. 
Sample. Attention should also be drawn to limitations concerning the sample as a 
whole. The sample used was fairly homogenous, in that most participants were young, 
white, female, and well-educated undergraduate students. Research has shown that 
performance on reasoning tasks is associated with cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 
1998) and belief bias scores have been found to decrease with intelligence and with training 
in analytical reasoning (MacPherson & Stanovich, 2007), both of which are likely to be 
present in educated groups. These factors may limit the generalizability of the findings. 
Further, the participants recruited were not from a clinical sample experiencing persecutory 
beliefs. In line with the continuum theory, non-clinical and clinical paranoia are related 
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experiences and are hypothesised to be associated with the same cognitive, behavioural and 
social biases (Freeman et al., 2010). However, differences between clinical and non-clinical 
experiences have been reported in the literature (Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, 
Delespaul & Krabbendam, 2009) so the application of the study findings to clinical samples 
should be made with caution. 
Measures. A strength of the current study is the use of well-validated measures 
with good psychometric properties. Self-report measures such as those used in the current 
study have several limitations, however, and can be influenced by a number of factors such 
as exaggeration, response bias and social desirability biases (Furnham & Henderson, 1982). 
In light of this however, online studies have been found to be less susceptible to this bias 
than face-to-face research (Furnham, 1986). In addition to this, the measure of paranoia 
used in the study could attract some criticism. The PS could be criticised for containing 
many items that are not clearly persecutory (e.g., ‘my parents and family find more fault 
with me than they should’) and does not provide an estimate of the frequency or distress of 
paranoid thoughts. This may limit the extent to which conclusions can be drawn about the 
experiences of the participants in relation to their paranoia. This limitation could be 
addressed in future studies by using a measure such as the Green Paranoid Thoughts Scale 
(GPTS), which addresses the distress caused by paranoid thoughts, as well as the conviction 
with which beliefs are held. It could be argued that these items better capture the paranoid 
experience (Green et al., 2008). Finally, whilst unlikely, it is possible that the rates of 
paranoia reported by the HP group study were inflated by participants’ experience of 
genuine persecution.   
Another limitation was that there were a large number of questionnaires used in the 
study. This may have impacted negatively on participants due to respondent fatigue. 
Respondent fatigue is a phenomenon that occurs when participants ‘become tired of 
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completing a questionnaire and the quality of the data they provide begins to worsen’ 
(Lavrakas, 2008). This might have had an impact on the validity of the measures used, but 
also may have had an emotional impact on the participants in the study, who were already 
struggling with difficult experiences.  
In addition, it could be argued that the syllogistic reasoning task used lacks 
ecological validity and that the use of a task which mimics every day decision-making 
processes may have been more suitable. The paranoia-related and non-specific syllogisms 
were obtained from a colleague in Italy and had been directly translated to English by the 
authors. The syllogism items then needed paraphrasing and adjusting to ensure that the 
items made grammatical sense. These changes to the syllogisms meant the questionnaire 
was not the same as the one which had been successfully used in previous research. Further, 
as discussed previously, the reliability of the syllogisms was low. Future research should 
ensure that attention and time is dedicated to the development of a reasoning task due to the 
importance of a valid and reliable measure in obtaining meaningful results (Kimberlin & 
Winsterstein, 2008).  
Future directions and clinical implications  
The current study highlights a range of possible avenues future research. A larger 
scale study should be conducted to ensure that more subtle differences in reasoning ability 
between groups can be detected. Future research could replicate the initial study, recruiting 
participants high in non-clinical paranoia, as well as a sample of clinically paranoid 
participants, to explore whether evidence for the belief bias theory and the HET are 
detected at a higher intensity in clinical participants. Syllogisms should be matched to 
individual concerns in a meaningful and relevant way in order to ensure that the 
hypothesised corresponding reasoning style can be elicited. It may be clinically relevant to 
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explore whether inducing a state of fear has any influence on logical reasoning abilities in 
individuals with psychological difficulties.  
Further, it is of note that cognitive therapy generally encourages analytic thinking in 
order to challenge dysfunctional judgements and moderate the influence of experiential 
reasoning. The Dual-Stream Modulation Failure model provides a basis to support the 
development of new metacognitive therapies designed to bring conscious awareness to the 
divergence of Type one and Type two thinking. Future research studies exploring whether 
manipulating therapeutically the type of reasoning style alters the course of delusions 
would be of value (Waller et al., 2011). There are also grounds to examine experiential and 
rational reasoning styles in relation to other delusion-relevant factors, such as belief 
flexibility and attribution biases (So et al., 2012). It would also be informative to assess 
these thinking styles in relation to other clinical variables such as global functioning, to 
explore the wider impact of different reasoning processes. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the present study did not support the predictions made in line with the 
HET and belief bias theory. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed, including the 
need to match content more idiographically to individual concerns and the use of a non-
clinical sample. A preference for analytic, and to some extent intuitive, thinking was found 
to be associated with paranoia severity in the HP group, a finding in contrast to some of the 
existing findings in the literature. It light of these results, it could be hypothesized that the 
simple presence or absence of analytical or intuitive reasoning may not be directly related 
to the maintenance of paranoid beliefs. It may well be the dynamic interaction between the 
two systems, the conscious modulation of these streams and the ways by which the 
reasoning styles are applied in certain situations may be more relevant to understanding 
delusional beliefs (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Further, the ways by which the two systems 
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interact appears to vary along the continuum of paranoia, as well as in different situations 
(eg., in state of fear in social situation vs. conducting a reasoning task online), though this 
warrants further research attention.  
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Chapter 3: Integration, Impact and Dissemination 
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INTEGRATION 
This thesis aimed to improve and further the understanding and treatment of 
reasoning biases across the psychosis continuum. More specifically, the thesis aimed to a) 
identify and synthesise the literature assessing the efficacy of cognitive interventions 
targeting reasoning biases in individuals with psychosis and b) explore logical reasoning 
abilities, as well cognitive style more generally, in delusion-prone individuals. Both papers 
highlighted the growing interest in the role of reasoning biases in the development and 
maintenance of psychotic symptoms such as paranoia.  
In preparation for the empirical study, I was required to do a great deal of 
background reading to get to grips with some of the concepts and terminology used in the 
experimental cognition literature. This involved a thorough exploration of the literature on 
the Hyper-emotion theory (HET) and the belief bias theory of psychological illness. Both 
theories have received support through research with individuals with a number of 
psychological difficulties, and have shown promising trends (Johnson-Laird et al., 2006).  It 
was suggested by several authors that the psychological treatment of psychological 
symptoms could change if the theories gained enough empirical support. For example, the 
HET suggests that psychological illnesses are merely transitions from normal life to 
abnormal emotions. The therapeutic goal would then be to undo the transitions and to undo 
otherwise expert patterns of inference that strengthen their effects.  
The systematic review topic was chosen due to its clear relevance to the empirical 
study; as I became interested in looking at how effective the current cognitive interventions 
were at ameliorating reasoning biases such as these. Although research exploring the 
treatment of reasoning biases in psychosis is rapidly expanding, a review of the literature 
had not previously been conducted. The review highlighted the wide variety of cognitive 
interventions available, as well as the range of reasoning biases implicated in psychosis. 
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Spending the time to absorb the literature in such a way resulted in a greater understanding 
of the literature, greatly aided the writing of the empirical paper and contributed to a more 
thorough understanding of some of the cognitive processes associated with psychosis.  
It was also of interest to explore whether many treatments targeting logical 
reasoning in psychosis had been developed and tested. The systematic review did not find 
any studies testing cognitive interventions targeting logical reasoning in psychosis. This 
finding highlighted a need within this area for further research with both non-clinical and 
clinical psychosis populations. However, during the review process it was apparent that 
many potentially relevant studies had not used controlled methodologies and thus were not 
amenable for inclusion in the review presented. In light of this, it should also be noted that a 
wider range of cognitive interventions targeting reasoning biases in psychosis likely exist, 
although were not represented in the review. Employing less-restrictive inclusion criteria in 
this regard might have lead to the inclusion of a wider range of interventions and the results 
may have been more representative of the interventions available.  
The empirical study explored logical reasoning abilities in delusion-prone 
individuals, which was born out of a desire to further understand reasoning processes 
associated with paranoid experiences. As was recognised through conducting the systematic 
review, a wide range of reasoning biases are implicated in paranoia, however the role of 
logical reasoning has received relatively little research attention. Recruitment for the 
empirical study proved to be extremely fruitful, even though previous research has found 
that individuals experiencing paranoia may be difficult to recruit for studies (MacKinnon, 
Newman-Taylor, & Stopa, 2011). The differences between clinical (as represented in the 
systematic review) and non-clinical participants (as included in the empirical article) should 
be noted, in particular differences in conviction and distress associated with the delusional 
beliefs, which are likely to separate clinical and non-clinical presentations (Kiran & 
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Chadhury, 2009). A major limitation of this study was the selective nature of the sample. 
For example, study participants were predominantly Caucasian and female, which is in 
stark contrast to the typical psychosis population (Kirkbride et al., 2008), as represented by 
many of the studies included in the systematic review. The empirical study did not find any 
support for the HET or the belief bias theory, however did find a relationship between 
paranoia severity and intuitive and analytical reasoning processes. The findings suggest that 
interventions targeting these various reasoning processes would have clinical utility. 
 
IMPACT AND DISSEMINATION 
The Economic and Social Research council (ESRC) defines research impact as 'the 
demonstrable contribution that excellent research makes to society and the economy'. This 
can involve academic impact, economic and societal impact, or both. It is anticipated that 
the findings from paper one will be submitted to the Clinical Psychology Review journal 
for publication. It is hoped that the findings of the systematic review will influence the 
recommendations made for specific reasoning biases and types of therapy offered by 
mental health services. Further, it is hoped that there will be an increased awareness of 
different therapy types available for use by mental health professionals following the 
dissemination of the review findings. If treatments are to be improved through tailoring 
interventions according to their efficacy, benefits are likely to be felt across systems. For 
example, individuals with psychosis are likely to benefit from a better quality of life and 
emotional wellbeing, which is likely to extend to the psychological well-being of their 
carers, who frequently experience a number of physical and psychological difficulties 
(Poon, Curtis, Ward, Loneragan & Lappin, 2018). Further, the economy may benefit from 
lower rates of unemployment if symptoms, and thus the functioning, of psychosis patients 
are improved. Further, the NHS could benefit from reduced costs associated with lower 
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levels of inpatient or emergency admissions, if individuals with psychosis are better able to 
function in the community. In light of this, however, while advances have been made over 
recent years, there is still much work needed in the development of effective psychological 
treatments for psychosis (Jones, Hacker, Cormac, Meaden & Irving, 2012). 
The findings from paper two have been presented to other trainee clinical 
psychologists and staff members at Royal Holloway via a PowerPoint presentation. The 
thesis will also be disseminated by including a copy in the institution’s electronic archives 
and will be submitted for publication to the Schizophrenia Research journal. As highlighted 
previously, whilst an expanding field, research into the HET and belief bias theory is in its 
infancy and the study data is too preliminary and inconclusive to change clinical practice. 
The impact of this research is likely to occur incrementally, in the context of a broader field 
of research, over time. It is hoped that the current research will inspire the development of 
studies testing the HET and belief bias theory in paranoia. Further, the findings highlight 
the importance of assessing, and potentially working therapeutically with, the application of 
different reasoning processes in individuals with psychosis (Freeman et al., 2014).  
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Appendix 3: Information sheet and consent form  
 
Information sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information sheet 
 
Study title: Thoughts about others and decision making 
 
My name is Natalie DeWeever and I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist studying at 
Royal Holloway, University of London. Before you decide whether to participate in 
this study, I would like you to understand what the research will involve and why the 
study is being conducted. Below you will find some information about the research. 
Please read this information carefully. If you have any questions, then please contact 
me using the email address listed below. 
 
What is the purpose of this study?  
 
The research aims to investigate how thoughts about other people influence decision 
making. We are also looking at how different ways of thinking more generally 
influences how people make decisions 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is your choice whether you participate or not and your participation is entirely 
voluntary. If you do decide to take part, then you are free to withdraw from the study 
at any time and you do not need to give a reason.  
 
What would taking part involve? 
 
If you decide to take part, you will be asked to complete a number of questionnaires 
and experimental tasks online. Some of these questionnaires will ask about personal 
things such as how you feel in social situations (e.g. you would be asked to rate how 
much you agree with statements). The study should take no longer than 30 minutes in 
total. 
 
Are there any disadvantages or risks to taking part? 
 
We do not anticipate that there will be any disadvantages to taking part, except for the 
time commitment taken to complete the questionnaires and tasks. Although it 
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is unlikely, it is possible that you may feel uncomfortable or distressed answering 
some of the questions you are asked. If this is the case, we have provided some 
information at the end of the study about seeking support if you are distressed. You 
are also free to not answer questions which you do not feel comfortable answering. 
 
Are there any benefits to taking part and what will happen to the results? 
 
If you are a first year undergraduate psychology student you will earn 2 course credits 
for your participation in this study. If you are not, you will be entered into a prize 
draw to win one of five £20 Amazon vouchers.  
 
Will my information remain confidential? 
 
All information that is collected during the course of the research will be kept 
confidential. The questionnaire scores and task data will be anonymised and stored 
securely on a database. Only the researchers will have access to the information you 
give during the study. The results from the research study will be written up and 
submitted as part of a Doctoral  
 
Who can I contact about the study? 
If you have any questions about the study, please contact me using the following 
contact details: 
  
Natalie DeWeever, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, Royal Holloway 
Natalie.DeWeever.2015@live.rhul.ac.uk 
  
If you have any concerns about how the study is being conducted, you can contact my 
supervisor using the details below: 
  
Dr Gary Brown 
Gary.Brown@rhul.ac.uk 
  
 
Thank you for considering taking part and/or taking time to read this information. 
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 Consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consent form 
 
 
 
Please confirm that you:  
 
 
Understand the nature of the study proposed, having read and understood the 
information sheet provided. I have had the opportunity to ask questions (via e-mail to 
natalie.deweever.2015@live.rhul.ac.uk), and I am satisfied with the answers I received. 
 
Yes 
No 
 
 
 
Understand that my participation in the study is entirely voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason 
 
Yes 
No 
 
Agree that if I decide to withdraw from the study then the researchers can continue to 
use the data and information I have already given them unless I ask for this to be 
destroyed. 
 
Yes  
No 
 
Agree to take part in the study  
 
Yes 
No 
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Appendix 4: Debrief form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Debrief form 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. If you are a first year undergraduate 
psychology student you will be awarded 2 course credits. If you are not and you have 
submitted your contact details before starting, you will now be entered into the prize 
draw where you will have a chance of winning one of five £20 Amazon vouchers. 
Your details will be separated from your responses to preserve confidentiality. 
  
What was the purpose of this study? 
  
Many people experience suspicious or worrisome thoughts about other people 
(Freeman et al, 2005). In this study we are interested in looking at whether these 
commonly experienced thoughts influence how people make decisions, particularly 
when the decision is related to these worries in some way. We are also looking at 
whether different thinking styles more generally (eg. analytical or logical approach to 
problems) influence how people make decisions. If you are interested in hearing about 
the results and conclusions of the study, please inform the principal researcher via 
email (Natalie.DeWeever.2015@live.rhul.ac.uk), 
  
Why is this useful? 
  
Worrisome thoughts are common and distressing so we are seeking to understand the 
factors that might maintain and reduce them. 
  
Will I be identifiable in this research? 
  
The results of this study will not/cannot include any identifiable information about 
you. 
  
What can I do if I feel distressed by any part of the study? 
  
We do not expect people to feel worse after completing this study, but if you do feel 
you would like some support to help with difficult emotions, please contact your GP 
and inform the principal researcher via email. The university also offers a counselling 
service, and you may also wish to contact the Samaritans: 
  
Royal Holloway Counselling Service 
  
Website: http://www.rhul.ac.uk/ecampus/welfare/counselling/home.aspx 
Telephone: 01784 443 128 
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Email: counselling@rhul.ac.uk 
Location: FW171 
  
Samaritans 
  
Website: http://www.samaritans.org/ 
Telephone: 08457 90 90 90 (UK) or 1850 60 90 90 (ROI) 
Email: jo@samaritans.org 
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Appendix 5: Empirical study measures 
 
Cognitive Reflection test (CRT-4; Frederick, 2005) 
 
 
(1) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink 
one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink 
one barrel of water together? _____ days 
 
 
 
(2) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the 
class. How many students are in the class? ______ students  
 
 
 
(3) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and 
sells it finally for $90. How much has he made? _____ dollars  
 
 
 
 
 
(4) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 
2008. Six months after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased 
were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon, from July 17 to 
October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, 
Simon has:  
 
a. broken even in the stock market 
b. is ahead of where he began,  
c. has lost money  
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Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) 
 
  
0: not at 
all 
1: a little 
bit 
2: some -
what 
3: very 
much 
4: extre -
mely 
1 
I am afraid of people 
in authority  
     
2 
I am bothered by 
blushing in front of 
people  
     
3 
parties and social 
events scare me  
     
4 
I avoid talking to  
people I don't know  
     
5 
being criticized 
scares me a lot 
     
6 
I avoid doing things 
or speaking to people 
for fear of 
embarrassment 
     
7 
sweating in front of  
people causes me 
distress 
     
8 
I avoid going to 
parties 
     
9 
I avoid activities in 
which  
I am the centre of 
attention 
     
10 
talking to strangers 
scares me 
     
11 
I avoid having to 
give speeches 
     
12 
I would do anything  
to avoid being 
criticized 
     
13 
heart palpitations 
bother me  
when I am around 
people 
     
14 
I am afraid of doing 
things  
when people might 
be watching 
     
15 
being embarrassed or 
looking stupid are 
among my worse 
fears 
     
16 
I avoid speaking to  
anyone in authority 
     
17 
trembling or shaking 
in front  
of others is 
distressing to me 
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Syllogism questionnaire (with key) 
 
 
SYLLOGISTIC REASONING QUESTIONNAIRE (S.R.Q.) 
 
 
 
In this questionnaire you will be asked to judge whether the conclusions presented  
are logically valid or not. By logically valid, we mean that the conclusion must be 
true, after taking into account the information given. Each question has two 
statements (A and then B) followed by a conclusion (C). Your task is to decide if C 
(the conclusion) logically follows from the two statements (A and B).  
• Choose YES if the suggested conclusion (C) follows logically from the 
previous statements (A and B)   
 
• Choose NO if the suggested conclusion does not follow logically from 
the preceding statements. 
For example: 
(A) No priests are criminals  
 
(B) Some religious people are criminals 
 
Does it logically follow that... 
 
(C) Some religious people are not priests 
 
Given the fact that no priests are criminals and some religious people are criminals, it 
must be true that some religious people are not priests. So this conclusion is valid.  
Please work through the problems in order and make sure you do not miss any. If you 
have any questions please let me know. 
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1. (A)  Sometimes, when my friends don’t believe me, I argue with them. 
 
 
      (B)  Every time my friends don’t believe me, I feel they’re plotting against me. 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
      (C) …sometimes, when I argue with my friends, I feel they’re plotting against 
me.  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
2. (A)  Every time I attend a funeral I feel like crying. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I feel like crying, I’m happy. 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
      (C) …sometimes, when I attend a funeral, I’m happy.  
 
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES      
NO 
 
3. (A)  Sometimes, when I’m alone, I start thinking. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I start thinking, I feel people are robbing me of my 
thoughts. 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
      (C) …sometimes, when I’m alone, I feel people are robbing me of my thoughts.  
 
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
4. (A)  Every time I walk down the street, I think I’m being followed. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I walk down the street, I feel I’m in danger. 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
      (C) …sometimes, when I think I’m being followed, I feel in danger.  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
5. (A)  All politicians are corrupt. 
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      (B)  Some of my friends are not corrupt. 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
(D) …some of my friends are not politicians.  
HE 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
6. (A)  Some antiabortionists are conservative. 
      (B)  All Catholics are antiabortionists. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some Catholics are conservative.  
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
7. (A)  All television messages are coded. 
(B) Some coded messages are harmless. 
 
 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) …some television messages are harmless.  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
8. (A)  Some men are not evil. 
      (B)  All rapists are men. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some rapists are not evil.  
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
9. (A)  Some of my persecutors are not friends of mine. 
      (B)  Everyone who is mad at me are friends of mine. 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 158 
      (C) … some of my persecutors are not mad at me.  
P 
YES    
NO 
 
10. (A)  Sometimes, when I get angry, I can’t control myself. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I feel insulted, I get angry. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) …sometimes, when I feel insulted, I can’t control myself.  
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
11. (A)  Some drug addicts are married. 
      (B)  Some married people are happy. 
Does it logically follow that… 
(C) …some drug addicts are happy.  
 
 
 
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
12. (A)  All alcoholics are violent people 
      (B)  Some violent people go to jail. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some alcoholics go to jail.  
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
13. (A)  Some priests are pedophiles. 
      (B)  All priests are male. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some pedophiles are male.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
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HE NO 
 
14. (A)  Some of the things that are taught by our parents are false. 
      (B)  Some of the things I believe, have been taught by my parents. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some of the things I believe are false.  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
15. (A)  Some murderers are not evil. 
      (B)  All violent people are evil. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some murderers are not violent.  
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
16. (A)  Some smart people are not evil. 
      (B)  All of my persecutors are smart people 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some of my persecutors are not evil  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
17. (A)  Every time that I watch TV, there are news reports about violence. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I watch the news on the TV, I feel at peace 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … sometimes, when there are news reports about violence I feel at peace  
HE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
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18. (A)  Some important people are happy. 
(B) Persecuted people are important people 
 
 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some persecuted people are happy.  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
19. (A)  Everytime I’m in a large crowd of people I hear them talking. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I hear people talking, I think they’re talking about me. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … sometimes, when I’m in a large crowd, I think they’re talking about me.  
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES       
NO  
20. (A)  Every time I suspect people, I feel safe. 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I feel persecuted, I don’t feel safe. 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … sometimes, when I feel persecuted, I don’t suspect people. 
P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
21.  (A)  Some nervous people are incompetent  
      (B)  All nervous people sweat 
Does it logically follow that… 
 
      (C) … some incompetent people sweat  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
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22.  (A)  Every time I interact socially, people judge me  
      (B)  Sometimes, when I interact socially, I feel confident 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … sometimes, when people judge me, I feel confident  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
23.  (A)  All easily embarrassed people blush 
      (B)  Some of my friends never blush 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some of my friends are not easily embarrassed  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
24.  (A)  When I am amongst strangers I am being judged 
      (B)  Sometimes, when I am judged, I value the feedback 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … Sometimes when I am amongst strangers, I value the feedback  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
25.  (A)  Some nervous people are self conscious  
      (B)  All people who are tongue-tied are nervous 
Does it logically follow that… 
      (C) … some people who are self-conscious are tongue tied  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
26  (A)  When I meet new people I feel confident 
             (B)  Sometimes, when I feel confident I speak loudly 
Does it logically follow that… 
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             (C) … When I amongst new people I speak loudly.  
SA 
YES    
NO 
 
27. (A)   Some people who stutter are confident 
             (B)  Confident people enjoy giving speeches. 
 
Does it logically follow that… 
             (C) … Some people who stutter enjoy giving speeches.  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
28. (A)  Every time I walk into a room full of people, I feel I nervous. 
             (B)  Sometimes when I am being watched, I feel vulnerable. 
Does it logically follow that… 
        (C) … Every time I walk into a room full of people, I feel vulnerable  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
29. (A)  Every time I meet new people I feel anxious. 
             (B)  Sometimes, when I feel anxious, I’m excited 
Does it logically follow that… 
(C) Every time I meet new people, I’m excited  
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
 
30. (A)  Every time someone in authority asks to speak to me, I feel scared. 
             (B)  Sometimes, when I am scared, I feel determined. 
Does it logically follow that… 
(C) Sometimes, when someone in authority asks to speak to me, I feel 
determined.  
 
SA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES    
NO 
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Depression and Anxiety Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
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REI-0 (Norris, Pacini & Epstein, 1998) 
 
 
Please use the following scale to answer these questions. 
 
Completely false       Completely true 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
1. _______  I prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. _______ I believe in trusting my hunches. 
3. _______ I trust my initial feelings about people. 
4. _______ I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about 
something.  
5. _______ Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little 
satisfaction. 
6. _______ When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut 
feelings." 
7. _______ I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't 
explain how I know. 
8. _______ I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.  
9. _______ I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather 
than something  that requires little thought. 
10. _______ My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 
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Beads task (Huq, Garety & Hemsley, 1988). 
 
 
 
Beads Task 
  
PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY: 
 
 
Two jars of beads are shown above. The first jar contains 60 red beads and 40 blue 
beads; this is the "mainly red jar". The second jar contains 60 blue beads and 40 red 
beads; this is the "mainly blue jar". 
 
In a moment, the two jars will be out of your view. A series of beads will be 
automatically selected from ONE of these jars one at a time. Each time a bead is 
drawn from the jar you will be shown its colour. This bead will then be returned to the 
SAME jar. The beads will then be shuffled. Importantly, the jars will NEVER be 
switched but will ALWAYS be drawn from the same jar. 
 
Your task is to stop drawing beads as soon as you feel confident that you can guess 
which jar the beads are being draw from. Each time a bead is drawn you will be given 
the option to either "decide now" or "see another bead". If you choose to "decide 
now" you will be asked to decide whether the beads had been drawn from the mainly 
red jar OR the mainly blue jar. 
  
Remember a) you can see as many beads as you like before making a decision, and b) 
you should make your decision as soon as you feel confident that you can guess 
which jar the beads are being drawn from. 
  
When you are confident that you understand these instructions and are ready to begin 
the task please move onto the next screen. 
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Paranoia scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992)
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Appendix 6: Correlation analysis (HP group) 
 
Correlations 
 SA_BIAS 
PA 
BIAS HE_BIAS 
TOTAL 
BIAS 
REIFIU 
total 
REINFC 
total PSTotal 
CRF 
Total Beads          C Conflict 
SA_BIAS Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.090 .044 .570** -.162 -.125 -.232 -.048 -.107 -.293 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.620 .810 .001 .368 .489 .193 .792 .552 .097 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
PA_BIAS Pearson 
Correlation 
-.090 1 .292 .514** .246 .137 .084 -.348* .122 -.208 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.620 
 
.093 .002 .160 .441 .636 .043 .492 .238 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
HE_BIAS Pearson 
Correlation 
.044 .292 1 .758** .123 .294 .219 -.317 .081 -.413* 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.810 .093 
 
.000 .488 .092 .213 .067 .647 .015 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
TOTAL 
BIAS 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.570** .514** .758** 1 .071 .184 .020 -.359* .041 -.528** 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .002 .000 
 
.696 .306 .912 .040 .819 .002 
N 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
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REIFIU 
total 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.162 .246 .123 .071 1 .477** .291 .303 .007 .174 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.368 .160 .488 .696 
 
.004 .095 .081 .969 .326 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
REINFC 
total 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.125 .137 .294 .184 .477** 1 .373* .017 .325 -.063 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.489 .441 .092 .306 .004 
 
.030 .923 .060 .722 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
PSTotal Pearson 
Correlation 
-.232 .084 .219 .020 .291 .373* 1 -.170 .046 -.057 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.193 .636 .213 .912 .095 .030 
 
.338 .795 .749 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
CRFTotal Pearson 
Correlation 
-.048 -.348* -.317 -.359* .303 .017 -.170 1 -.159 .261 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.792 .043 .067 .040 .081 .923 .338 
 
.369 .136 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Beads Pearson 
Correlation 
-.107 .122 .081 .041 .007 .325 .046 -.159 1 .232 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.552 .492 .647 .819 .969 .060 .795 .369 
 
.187 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
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Conflict Pearson 
Correlation 
-.293 -.208 -.413* -.528** .174 -.063 -.057 .261 .232 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.097 .238 .015 .002 .326 .722 .749 .136 .187 
 
N 33 34 34 33 34 34 34 34 34 34 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 7: Methodological assessment of reviewed studies 
 
 
